

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_158811

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

WAZIRISTAN, 1936—1937

WAZIRISTAN

I936—I937

The Problems of the North-West
Frontiers of India and their Solutions

By

LIEUT.-COLONEL C. E. BRUCE
C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E., O.B.E.

ALDERSHOT:
GALE & POLDEN, LTD., WELLINGTON WORKS
AND AT LONDON AND PORTSMOUTH

Price 3s. 6d. (Per Post 3s. 10d.)

Printed in Great Britain by
GALE & POLDEN, LTD., WELLINGTON WORKS
ALDERSHOT
1938

FOREWORD

BY

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR CLAUD JACOB, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.

AND

SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I.

MANY people are asking why there are periodical outbursts of lawlessness in Waziristan and why the country has not settled down. This book will give the answer.

The author, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Bruce, C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E., has spent many years on the North-West Frontier and in Baluchistan. His father before him had the advantage of serving many years with Sir Robert Sandeman both in Baluchistan and in the Derajat.

We, whose signatures are appended, also spent many years in Baluchistan, on the North-West Frontier and in the Punjab. We know with what success Sir Robert Sandeman made Baluchistan into a well-ordered and prosperous province. We also know that he never had a failure. It was he who opened up the Gumal Pass, although the politicals in the Punjab had been sitting before those mountain ranges in Waziristan for years and did nothing but indulge in countless expeditions, which were really "burn and scuttle" affairs which subdued the tribe or tribes concerned for a time, but were unable to prevent a return to lawlessness as before. For over seventy years did this policy persist, until after the Great War, when it was evident that we must occupy Waziristan up to the Durand Line. First of all, roads were made to enable our troops to move in any direction they pleased. Then trade was encouraged and the country opened up. That policy was pursued with success till 1931: but since then we have lost faith in ourselves and the tribes have lost faith in us. Most important of all, the country needs a firm, consistent policy and Political Officers of the right stamp to carry it out. Our failure in recent years is probably due to the absence of both. As Lawrence wrote in the 1857 Mutiny, "When have we ever failed when we acted vigorously; when have we succeeded when guided by timorous counsels?"

Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce explains all this in his book, and we strongly recommend the study of it to all those who want to see a Frontier under proper control.

Are there no Political Officers of Sir Robert Sandeman's type left in India? It will be a sad day for us if we fail to produce good men as we did in the past.

A good deal more could be written on this subject, but we think Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce has fully interpreted the views of those of us who have the welfare of the Frontier tribes at heart, and who are much concerned at the wavering policy on the North-West Frontier during recent years.

Having two borders—the Durand Line and the Administrative Border—on the North-West Frontier is the primary cause of all this unrest, and the sooner we occupy and administer all the tribal territory right up to the Durand Line the better will be our relations with the people who live in what might well be classified as No Man's Land.

As Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce's father wrote many years ago :

“ There is only one true remedy and that is to do away with all feeble makeshifts such as ‘ Protected Areas ’ and by the exercise of a just and civilizing control secure safety of life and property and the development of the country and its resources. Thus only can we hope to secure the respect of the tribes on both sides of the border and bring them definitely in on our side, a source of strength instead of an ever-present danger.”

A French observer recently wrote :

“ The question is not whether England has the right to keep India, but whether she has the right to leave it.”

If we are to keep it we must have a secure and contented North-West Frontier.

CLAUD W. JACOB, *Field-Marshal,*

M. F. O'Dwyer, *I.C.S.,*

Late Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab.

PREFACE

To the authors of the books given in the Bibliography at the end of this note on Waziristan—and to many others also—I am indebted in varying measure. Some of them I have quoted from. Others I have read and studied with the object of seeing how the problem of making these tribesmen into our friends can best be solved. For no policy which has not got this as its main object can, I believe, possibly succeed.

Should, then, any of my readers be sufficiently interested in the subject to wish to go farther into the matter, I think they would find from a perusal of these authorities that the characteristics of these warrior-tribes all over the world are much the same and that the only system which has any hope of carrying out this object is one based on the principles advocated in this note—call it “the Sandeman policy,” or “Indirect Rule” (as it is called in Africa), or what you will.

For such a system, based as it is on the welfare of the tribesmen committed to our charge, must, in the long run, tend to make them into loyal subjects—a source of strength to the Empire instead of an ever-present danger; whereas the alternative policy, which fails to take this aspect of the problem sufficiently into consideration, “leaves them half-savage and embitters them against their rulers.”

The one policy deserves to succeed. The other does not.

C. E. BRUCE.

CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
I. WAZIRISTAN AND THE FRONTIER GENERALLY 1
II. THE WAZIRISTAN DISTURBANCES OF 1936-37 4
III. THE BASIS OF THE TRIBAL ORGANIZATION AND THE TRIBES-MEN'S MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD 7
IV. THE LOSS OF THE HEADMEN'S POWER AND INFLUENCE	... 10
V. TRIBAL INDEPENDENCE 14
VI. TRIBAL AND VILLAGE RESPONSIBILITY 16
VII. EXPENSE OF SUCH A POLICY 24
VIII. GOVERNMENT'S TERMS TO THE WAZIRISTAN TRIBES, 1937	... 29
IX. ROADS A MEANS TO AN END AND NOT AN END IN THEMSELVES	32
X. WHAT IS MEANT BY "SUPPORTING" THE HEADMEN	... 39
XI. THE OUTLAW PROBLEM 45
XII. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DISTRICT AND POLITICAL OFFICERS AS WELL AS THE HEADMEN 57
XIII. FUTURE POLICY 73
XIV. THE END AND OBJECT OF OUR POLICY 76
BIBLIOGRAPHY 80

MAP 1—THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIERS OF INDIA, SHOWING THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (ITS TRIBAL TERRITORY AND ADMINISTERED DISTRICTS) AND BALUCHISTAN *At end*

MAP 2—WAZIRISTAN *At end*

CHAPTER I.

Waziristan and the Frontier Generally.

*“It may be that we can no longer share the faith
which from our fathers we received,*

*It may be that our doom is to despair where they
with joy believed.”*

“Where faith fails, all fails.”

THE heritage left to us on the North-West Frontiers of India, after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, was a heritage of districts inhabited by tribes from whom our immediate predecessors—the Sikhs—had exacted revenue, more often than not, at the point of the bayonet, dominated by a long strip of mountainous tribal territory, the home of the warrior-tribes, who owned allegiance to no one, ever at war amongst themselves and a constant menace to the peace of the “border.”

It is this strip of tribal territory, separating India from Afghanistan, which has always constituted the main Frontier problem.

At the present time, the north-west frontiers of India are divided, for purposes of administration, into the North-West Frontier Province (a Governor's province) and Baluchistan, which includes the Khanate of Kalat (a Baluch or Indian State).

Waziristan is the southernmost portion of the belt of tribal territory which separates the administered (or “settled”) districts of the North-West Frontier Province from Afghanistan, while immediately to the south of it lies the Zhob district of Baluchistan.

To deal with the problem of the Frontier tribes which inhabited the North-West Frontiers of India, two very different systems were adopted in the past.

- (1) The “*Sandeman System*,” called after its great progenitor, which was adopted with such marked success in Baluchistan; and
- (2) The “*Close Border System*,” adopted for the remainder of the Frontier.

The fundamental difference between these two policies was that Sandeman, like Marshal Lyautey—who *admittedly* followed in his footsteps—looked at the problem from the point of view of “the welfare of the tribes” and realized the “moral obligation” which this entailed.

His was a policy of "peaceful penetration," based on "knowledge and sympathy" with the tribal point of view, its object the gradual civilization and betterment of the tribes.

That is the point I wish to stress. The ultimate goal—and the end and aim of his policy—was "the welfare of the tribes" committed to his charge. And it was because the tribes came, by degrees, to realize how much better off they were under his administration that, gradually and almost imperceptibly, Sandeman was able to absorb the whole strip of territory which constitutes the present province of Baluchistan.

And the measure of his success can be gauged from the fact that, through all the convulsions which have lately been disturbing India, Baluchistan, with a few very minor exceptions, has remained "contentedly quiet."

Why did Sandeman's policy succeed? Surely because it fulfilled so entirely the supreme test of all successful administration—"the welfare of the people," the welfare of the tribes.

THE "CLOSE BORDER" SYSTEM. (*See Map No. 1.*)

The "Close Border" system, called sometimes "a policy of non-intervention tempered by punitive expeditions," was the very reverse of this. It hardly considered this aspect of the case. For, under that system, this belt of tribal territory (see the area between the red lines on the plan attached) was left not only in a state of anarchy and chaos, but continued to be a sanctuary for outlaws and raiding gangs who harried the districts.

That is to say, while, under the Sandeman system, the administrative border was carried up to the Afghan frontier, this was not the case as regards the remaining tribes which came under the political sphere of influence first of the Punjab and later of the North-West Frontier Province. Here, between the "settled" districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan—still administered more or less on the Punjab model—there remained a belt of semi-independent tribal territory, which constituted a perpetual menace to the peace and happiness of our tax-paying subjects within the districts.

Under a policy of non-intervention, like the "Close Border" system, the only real redress which the authorities had when the tribes misbehaved themselves was fines and expeditions, which last, punishing as it too often did the innocent rather than the guilty, inevitably left behind it "a legacy of hatred and contempt."

Even when compelled by force of circumstances eventually to take over the passes, the "Close Border" still refused to assume control of the "intervening" country.

MIDDLEMEN.

Another serious flaw in the policy of non-intervention was that British political officers, being forbidden, or certainly discouraged, to cross the "border," had, perforce, to depend very greatly on "middlemen" (or go-betweens) in their dealings with and for their knowledge of the tribes. It can, therefore, well be imagined what enormous opportunities this system gave these "middlemen" for intrigue and for amassing wealth. And it would, indeed, have been wonderful if many had not succumbed to such temptation, much to the detriment of any really friendly relations with the tribes. To such men the less a British political officer knew about the tribes the better pleased they were.

On the evils of this system of "middlemen" the late Lord Lytton gave countless warnings, as did Sir Robert Warburton,* whose unrivalled knowledge of, and influence over, the Afridi tribe were able to counteract, to a large extent, the evils of the system. But even he gave it as his "firm and solemn conviction" that the majority of our troubles on the Frontier were due "to the evil intrigues and machinations of these men."

Being just as convinced, as was Warburton, of the truth of this allegation, I cannot help wondering whether, when we reverted to a policy of "Protected Areas" in Waziristan—a policy with many of the inherent defects of the "Close Border" system—the troubles which came down upon us were not largely due to these causes.

FAILURE OF THE "CLOSE BORDER."

At any rate, there is no gainsaying the fact that the history of the Frontier is a long succession of failures on the part of the "Close Border" system.

Why? Surely because it failed so completely to fulfil the supreme test—"the welfare of the tribes."

And the measure of its failure is to be seen in the long list of punitive expeditions which have blackened the history of our dealings with the tribes along this portion of the Frontier.

And to this long list of expeditions we have now been compelled to add yet another one, with all its attendant loss in lives and money.

To what must we attribute this failure? To the fact that, instead of carrying the policy of the gradual Sandemanization of Waziristan to its logical conclusion, we reverted to a half-hearted policy of "Protected Areas." Is that the reason?

* "Eighteen Years in the Khyber," by Sir Robert Warburton.

CHAPTER II.

The Waziristan Disturbances of 1936-37.

THE WAZIRISTAN POLICY OF 1922-23.

IN all the comments on the Waziristan disturbances, I have found few which have attempted to explain what were the root-causes of our present troubles in that country or what was the real reason for the present "Rising"; and, with the exception of an able article in *Truth* of the 9th June, 1937, none which have tried to put forward a case for the tribes themselves.

One of Sir Robert Sandeman's great principles, and one which contributed very largely to his success in Baluchistan, was that he never assumed that an offending tribe was "the sole sinner and never sinned against." Is it too much to say that, once again, despite this lesson, we did assume that the tribesmen were solely to blame? But were they?

About the year 1922-23, after years of vacillation, a policy, built more or less on the foundations of the Sandeman policy, was adopted in Waziristan—a policy of "control from within" and of supporting the tribal headmen in carrying out their primary duties of maintaining law and order within their own tribes.

Razmak was occupied by a force of all arms. Later, Wana was reoccupied. A network of roads was made. The tribesmen were given employment as "khassadars" (levies), and every effort was made to bring those "moral and material benefits," of which they were so sorely in need, within the tribesmen's reach.

THE SUCCESS OF THE WAZIRISTAN POLICY OF 1922-23.

Any reader who wishes to convince himself as to the unqualified success of that policy can easily do so by referring to the Annual Reports of the years 1923-30 (and indeed for some years afterwards), as well as to the Press commentaries during the same period.

If he takes the trouble to do so, he will find that, by the adoption of a policy of rebuilding on "existing frameworks,"

not only were outlaws* from the neighbouring districts practically wiped out (and without outlaws with a local knowledge of the districts "raids" do not occur), but that peace also reigned both inside and across our borders. He will find that so great was the success that even the most sceptical were converted.

QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED.

In face of these facts and of the incontrovertible proofs which are open to all to examine, surely the question we should ask ourselves is not, as argued by a correspondent in *The Times* of the 20th April, "Why is it that after some fifteen years of occupation and so-called administration, that country [Waziristan] is still as uncivilized and unmanageable as if it had never been occupied at all?"

No, that is not the question.

The questions we should ask ourselves are two:—

- (1) What were the reasons for the success of the Government's policy in Waziristan from, say, 1923 to 1933? and
- (2) Why is it that, after ten years of universally admitted success, Waziristan has again flared up and we are once again faced with vast expenditure on the Frontier?

The fact that I spent the years 1923 to 1928 in, or on the borders of, Waziristan, either as D.C. of one of the neighbouring districts or as "Resident, Waziristan," and had, therefore, a great deal to do with the carrying out, if not the inauguration, of the said policy—a policy which had been very strongly advocated by my father some forty years before—may be considered as giving me certain qualifications for speaking on the present situation in Waziristan—that, and the fact that, like my father before me, I spent some thirty-five years on India's North-West Frontiers.

What was the policy then adopted? It was a policy of "peaceful penetration" and of gradual "Sandemanization," in commenting on the success of which *The Times* remarked, "It seems the Pathan can after all be Sandemanized."

Was *The Times*, then, wrong? Were the almost universal tributes to the success of the policy entirely unjustified? No, I do not think so. On the contrary, I believe that our present troubles have been due not to a failure of that policy, but to a failure on our part to interpret accurately what were the causes of our success. And I believe that, as a consequence of that

want of recognition, we subsequently went back on, and failed to carry out, many of the fundamental principles on which the success, not only of that policy but also that of Sir Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan, had been based.

The very fact that there are officers who believe that the present policy of "Protected Areas" is the same policy as the one which had proved so successful seems to prove—as I will show later—how blind they were to the real causes of the success.

CHAPTER III.

The Basis of the Tribal Organization and the Tribesmen's Means of Livelihood.

DESPERATELY poor, for the most part, with little or no cultivation to supply their needs, and only a precarious living to be made out of their flocks, the tribesmen had, in the past, depended very greatly on "raiding" to make up any deficiencies in their means of livelihood.

Believing with Marshal Lyautey that "the right of colonization is only justified by the moral and material benefits extended by the colonizing nation," Sandeman recognized the fact that, while our tax-paying subjects, in "the settled districts," were entitled to protection against the depredations of the tribesmen, once this had been secured the latter also had the right to live. In short, he never lost sight of the fact that, if "raiding" was put a stop to, both justice and humanity alike demanded that the tribesmen should be given something better to replace the means of livelihood which was being taken from them.

Believing—again with Lyautey—that "in every country there are" existing frameworks "to do away with which must lead to anarchy"; also that "in every tribe there is a ruling-class, born to rule, without which nothing can be done," Sandeman, "finding the power and influence of the headmen much diminished, proceeded to rebuild it under competent chiefs and headmen."

CONTROL FROM WITHIN.

Recognizing, also, that "control from within" was necessary to give adequate support to the headmen in keeping law and order, his policy became one of "peaceful penetration," generally at the request of the tribes themselves. "Peaceful penetration," in turn, led to the development of the country and its resources, to the benefit of the tribes concerned. In other words, by making their interests his own, Sandeman proved to the tribes that, in place of their independence, he had something much better to give them—namely, justice. In short, it was a policy of civilization built on the rock of "justice"—justice to the poor and the oppressed—and one which therefore completely fulfilled "the supreme test"—the welfare of the masses.

Let us not forget, however, that, before Sandeman could obtain success, he had to *rebuild* his administration on the old foundations, which had been falling into decay.

We, in 1923, like Sandeman in Baluchistan, had penetrated into Waziristan and had taken over "control from within," and it was up to us, therefore, to see that the other fundamental principles by which his policy was governed were also carried out. That is to say, we had to use that "control" for the welfare of the tribes themselves, as only by doing so could we hope to make these wild but fascinating tribesmen into our friends instead of our enemies. We also had to prove to them that loyalty and good conduct paid.

Whether we failed or succeeded, the history of those ten years and the statistics showing an amazing decrease in crime, both in the neighbouring districts and in Waziristan itself, will, I am certain, amply demonstrate. At least, we tried.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS RESOURCES IN THE INTERESTS OF THE TRIBES.

But have we continued to do so? Have we continued to develop the country and its resources in the interests of the tribes? That is the point.

For instance, having very rightly considered that "control from within" was necessary, if we were to give adequate support to the headmen, ought we not to have seen that, if this support was to be effective, we must not shirk our responsibilities, but gradually spread our influence over the whole country? "Having," in Lord Roberts's words, "refused to let the tribes look for government to any other Power except ourselves," had we any right to refuse them the protection and support "which our control of the country should have implied"?

MORAL OBLIGATION TO THE TRIBES.

Instead, however, of doing this and thus proving to them the benefits of our occupation, did we not try to excuse ourselves from carrying out our moral obligations by pretending that the tribesmen so love their independence that, rather than lose this, they would prefer that "the intervening tribal areas" should remain in a state of chaos and anarchy? At any rate, that is a question we must ask ourselves.

"The State may refuse to extend its responsibilities, but for the fate of the Pathan clans, within the Durand line [whether

we like it or not], the British Government is responsible. For the Government to pretend that there is any question of maintaining the independence of the tribes is a fiction which cannot pass current with honest men." (Yet, when it suits us to do so, we still go on trying to maintain that fiction.) "Both economically and in every other way they are dependent on us. If their headmen, at our solicitation, consign valuable strategic positions to us, surrender outlaws and maintain law and order, thereby often fixing a halter round their necks and inheriting relentless blood-feuds, are we entitled to shirk our responsibilities?" These words were written many years ago. But do they not hold equally good to-day?

CHAPTER IV.

The Loss of the Headmen's Power and Influence.

ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE HEADMEN.

At any rate, before we accuse the headmen of having lost their power and influence to control their tribesmen—about the only reason I have seen given for the present “Rising”—ought we not, first, to ask ourselves, “Why is it that these same headmen did have the requisite power and influence, for so many years and now no longer have it?”? And, again, whether we ourselves have not been greatly to blame for the decrease in their power and influence. Is it a case of “Qui s’excuse, s’accuse”?

TRIBAL GRIEVANCES.

For example, was there no justification for the tribal grievances set forth by *Truth's* correspondent?

After we had reconquered Waziristan we certainly did agree (about 1922-23), as he says, that, all things being equal, “preference for all contracts and supplies” would be given to the tribesmen concerned. And during the ten years I am speaking of every effort was made to carry out this pledge. Skilled labour might sometimes have to be given to “down-country” or even “Hindu” contractors, but *unskilled* labour was given to the tribesmen.

Perhaps a specific example of the principles on which we worked may be of interest to the reader.

HINDU CONTRACTOR'S STORY.

The road from Sarwekai to Wana was being made. When completed it was known that we should require a contract for the “mails” from Jandola to Sarwekai and on to Wana by motor. This road passes through tribal territory. A Bannu Hindu contractor, who had run “mail” contracts for many years, applied for the contract. He was a good business man with plenty of experience. He also had “capital” behind him to carry out the work successfully. The tribal headmen, without assistance, had none of these qualifications. So, the headmen, through whose limits the road passed, were called in and the case put to them. Then they and the contractor got together and, with assistance from us, a working agreement was

arrived at. The contractor agreed to open a school for tribal motor drivers at Sarwekai, who were to be ready to take over as soon as the mail contract came into force. And, I hope and believe, this was done.

In short, the Hindu contractor was to run the business part of the transaction, the labour was to be tribal, and the benefits to be shared to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned. In this manner the work would be satisfactorily done and our pledges to the tribes carried out.

How far we went against these principles subsequently, as described by *Truth's* correspondent, I cannot say, as I left Waziristan in 1928 when, according to him, the change first began to take place.

All I can say is that to carry out these pledges, even at that time, required incessant vigilance and a very close watch being kept on the persistent efforts—many of them subterranean in nature—made by both Hindu and “down-country” contractors—often surreptitiously assisted by self-interested persons—to get the works into their hands.

No one will argue that we were not justified in trying to cut down exorbitant rates, but to do this it should not have been necessary to have given “an increasing amount to Hindu contractors” which, if *Truth's* correspondent is correct, is what we subsequently did do. Indeed, as Mahsud and Wazir tribal contractors became more experienced, surely more, and not less, work should have been given to them.

They may not have been justified in their grievances, but at least we ought to ask how far we ourselves may have been to blame for the present state of affairs.

FUTILE EXCUSES.

As far back as 1902 my father pointed out how we had induced the headmen to cede to us portions of their country in the hope, at least on their part, that by doing so they would be ensuring a strong government, ready and willing to support them in keeping order; but, “having appropriated what we wanted,” we left the *remainder* of the country in a state of chaos and anarchy, refusing to give the headmen the requisite support therein and then turned round and put forward “the threadbare excuse which has served to cover most of our political failures on the Frontier that they (the headmen) possess no authority and have no influence over their clansmen.”

Is it merely a coincidence that now that we have been faced with yet another “political failure” on the Frontier we are falling back on the same old excuse? And is the real reason, for the headmen's loss of power attributable to the same causes, namely, to our shirking our responsibilities? For,

since these words were written we have penetrated much farther into Waziristan and have taken over additional control. We should, therefore, have been able to give them even greater support. Yet, still the same old problem confronts us and still the same old threadbare excuses are being given: "The headmen have no power," "The tribesmen so love their independence that they cannot be controlled by their headmen."

Of course, they prefer independence if they see that there is little or no benefit coming to them from "control." But when we say that "the tribesmen are anxious to benefit economically from the policy of 'peaceful penetration,' or rather to participate in the pecuniary benefits which the construction of roads brings with it," this is certainly correct. But, on the other side, we must remember that they are not willing that the pecuniary benefits should go only to the few, which is so often if not invariably the case when "control" is inadequate. They are certainly "sturdier in their pleas for independence" if they think we are not carrying out our side of the bargain. The young men are certainly "hostile," if they see, as they often do see, that, owing to our refusal to extend "control," the benefits are not fairly distributed.

If by saying that "the existing policy . . . has accomplished much" it is meant to imply that the "existing policy" is the one which proved so successful from 1923 onwards, I cannot agree that it is the same policy. Because a so-called policy of "peaceful penetration" which refuses to penetrate—or, if it does penetrate, refuses to extend "peace"; and a policy of "protected areas" which refuses to protect is not that policy. And it most certainly has nothing in common with Sandeman's policy. Such a policy may have brought temporary peace and security to our fellow-subjects, but did it bring justice, security and peace to the majority of the tribesmen; and did it bring them the benefits they expected? It may have done so. But that, surely, is the question we must ask ourselves.

KHONIA KHEL, "RAIDER'S," VIEWS ON THE GOVERNMENT'S "MORAL OBLIGATIONS."

Perhaps my readers may remember that the leader of the "raiders" who ambushed the column in the Shahur Defile, when seven British officers were killed and several others wounded, was said to have been a famous Jalal-Khel-Mahsud "raider," Khonia Khel.

It may, therefore, be of some interest to know what this famous "raider"—who was well known to the writer—had to say on the subject of our "moral obligation" to the tribes, as well as the reasons he gave for his having adopted the profession of "raider."

As "khon" means "blood" in Pushtu, it may be said that "Bloody Bill" was an appropriate name for a man who was reputed to have shot more Wazirs than any other Mahsud of his time.

"Sahib," he said, "I have three wives and five strapping sons like myself, and several sisters with large families. You have stopped me raiding in the Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts, as well as in the Tochi Valley. Now I hear you are going to stop me raiding in the Khaisora." (This valley—now figuring so largely in the present operations—is in tribal territory. And, as a matter of fact, Khonia Khel was shot, about a fortnight later, when unsuccessfully trying to raid there. But, as is now only too apparent, he was not killed.) "You will not even allow me to raid in Birmal or Khost, although these valleys are in Afghanistan. There has been no rain and so no grazing for my flocks. How, then, am I to live?"

I pointed out that I was continually fighting their cause in this respect. To this Khonia Khel answered, "Yes, sahib, I know you are, but, for heaven's sake, go on." I promised that I would do so. Indeed, that is one of my main reasons for trying to put forward, however inadequately, the case for the tribes.

All I can say in Khonia Khel's defence is that he never gave us the slightest trouble all that time. Why, then, has he once again taken to the war-path—not against the neighbouring tribes, but this time against the Government?

I do not know for certain. But may it not be that, in the interim, we have been allowing our "moral obligations" to the tribesmen either to fall into abeyance or, at least, to take a very secondary position?

CHAPTER V.

Tribal Independence.

INDEED, whenever I have been asked by officers, " What right have we to take away the independence of the tribes? " I have always answered, " None whatever unless we give them something better to replace what we are taking away." That is our only justification—that and our bounden duty to our fellow-subjects to establish peace on the border and to save them from the depredations of the tribesmen.

But that, when all is said and done, is the only true justification for our Empire—namely, that it has given the peoples who came beneath its sway justice where there was injustice, and peace where there was no peace. And to those who still believe in the benefits of civilization and the welfare of the masses as the test of all administration, surely no better justification is required.

To argue that countries and peoples have been exploited for gain; that much tyranny and oppression has taken place in the name of trade and under the cloak of " civilization," is merely to have studied history. But does that fact damn true civilization? Much tyranny was done, in the past, under the cloak of Christianity. But does that necessarily condemn Christianity? A man professing Christianity may commit a murder, but is it fair to lay the blame on Christianity?

What I do aver is that, whatever sins may be laid to our account on these points, we can at least look back with satisfaction to the fact that such was not the case with the great majority of our *administrators*. These men, with few exceptions, set a brilliant example of selfless devotion to duty. And those that succeeded did so because they placed the welfare of the peoples committed to their charge before all other considerations.

Of course, some of the tribesmen regret their loss of independence. Doubtless some of the " Highlanders " had their regrets. But there never was a greater delusion than to believe that the great majority of the tribes are contented with chaos and the suffering which goes with it. That was certainly not the opinion of a wild Mahsud tribesman when, pointing at the Razmak Plateau, he exclaimed to me, " Oh, sahib, what a difference in a few years! This plateau for generations past

was a place of bloodshed and strife, Mahsud and Wazir ever warring for the mastery. Now it is a 'badshah's' (king's) country where a man can go about his lawful occasions in peace."

"The tribes have no government and are in need of one," said Lord Roberts. Yes, but what the tribes do not want is the shadow without the substance—the shadow of an independence which is really non-existent, without the substance, which alone would make the loss of that independence acceptable. But is this not what we are giving them if, instead of spreading our influence over the whole country—on the old excuse of a mythical independence—we adopt a retrograde policy of so-called "Protected Areas," a policy of caring only for the safety of the roads and the country in their immediate vicinity, while denying the headmen and the tribes protection outside that radius?

"PROTECTED AREAS."

For what are "Protected Areas"? Protected against whom? Protected by the tribesmen and their leaders for our benefit? A crime is committed in the so-called "Protected Area"—on the road. The headmen are called on to bring the culprit to justice, *wherever he may be*. But are we ready to give support to the headmen and protect them outside that radius, or do we make the excuse that "it does not concern us"? Is that what "Protected Areas" means? I do not know. But I do know that "you cannot expect support if you are unable or unwilling to give support" *wherever it may be required*. I know also that "the tribesmen have ever regarded our failure to control these tribal tracts as weakness." That, surely, was what was meant by one of the Wazir headmen when he said—before we had reoccupied Wana—"Either act in Wana in a manner worthy of the rulers of India (that is, come and support us), otherwise you cannot expect us to do your work for you and thereby incur the enmity of our tribe."

CHAPTER VI.

Tribal and Village Responsibility.

“TRIBAL and village responsibility,” worked through the headmen, was another of the foundations of the Sandeman system, just as it was of the Waziristan policy of 1923-28, and I venture to assert that it was the rigid enforcement of this principle which was responsible for the peace which reigned from 1923 onwards.

I know I shall be told—and indeed have been told—that “never was ‘tribal responsibility’ more rigidly enforced than just before these disturbances.”

To that I would reply, “Had the same *methods* been employed and the same action taken, then such crimes as were reported could not *possibly* have taken place.”

Principles alone are no use unless the *methods* of carrying them out are understood and adopted.

The principles of the “League of Nations” may have been all they were painted, but they failed because either the *methods* by which alone they could have been carried out were not understood, or because no nation was ready to adopt those methods unless their own vital interests were endangered.

And if Sandeman were alive to-day he might well say with Lyautey, “It is extraordinary that after all I have written and all I have done no one understands my *methods*.”

Of course, “to the dweller in England, brought up in the maxim that it is better that many guilty should escape rather than one innocent man should suffer,” it may seem the grossest injustice that the sins of the “unruly elements” should be visited on the tribe or section.

But would they really think so if, as Sir Herbert Edwards pointed out, “this maxim came to extend to this, ‘It is better that all criminals should escape rather than one innocent man should suffer’?” I think not. Nor would they think so if they lived in some Frontier village and never knew from day to day whether they would be raided that very night or not. Ask the Hindus of the Dera Ismail Khan district whether they thought so in 1919. Ask them whether they believe in this maxim in its entirety, and I have little doubt as to what their answer would be!

Moreover, you cannot compare the situation in Western and

Eastern countries. They are not on all fours because, as Major Jarvis pointed out as regards the Arabs, "One cannot call a tribe innocent if it is an accessory before or after the fact and as there is nothing secret in the Arab world [the same applies equally to the Pathan world] the whole tribe, who are cognisant of the crimes of their bad-men [“badmashes”] and who actively assist them in their escape from justice, are just as guilty as the actual offender. Nor is there any moral objection, as it is a code which the Arab [equally with the Pathan] willingly accepts and himself applies” far more rigorously than we would ever think of doing.

Furthermore, during the period I am speaking about, every effort was made in Waziristan to bring the *actual offenders* to book. And it was only when the headmen were unable, or unwilling—even with active assistance from us, where necessary—to do their duty that “tribal responsibility” was enforced. Indeed, in almost all cases, with effective assistance from us, the headmen were able to do so. But they had to be assured that we had the power and the will to protect them against revenge or reprisals, wherever they were.

Here we were merely following the methods of General John Jacob when he quietened the tribes on the Sind frontier—methods which were to be largely adopted by Sandeman later.

That this is so is clear from a perusal of page 168 of Innes Shand’s “Life of General John Jacob,” where it is written that under his regime “the *actual evil-doer*” (the italics are my own) “was punished; but neither his family nor tribe. No excuses were admitted on the ground of tribal feuds or time-honoured customs.”

So when I hear from officers that “never was tribal responsibility more rigidly enforced than just before these disturbances,” I cannot help wondering what form this enforcement took; whether the axiom of only putting the responsibility on to the clan or section, *after* they had failed to give adequate assistance in bringing the *actual evil-doer* to book, was observed or not. It is so much simpler, for the moment, to put the responsibility on to the tribe or section, thereby, however, often punishing the innocent rather than the guilty. But the easy way is not always the best in the long run, nor does the punishment of the innocent either appeal to the tribes’ sense of justice or always have the desired effect. It is an axiom on the Frontier that it is a weak policy and not a strong one which leads to injustice and repressive measures. And so it is with the policy of “tribal responsibility.” Injustice is far more likely to occur under a policy of “Protected Areas” than it is under one which does not shirk its full responsibilities. “The strong can afford to be just.”

The system of "tribal responsibility" must not be abused. It must be carried out in accordance with the tribal sense of justice. And how this can be done possibly the following story will illustrate.

At the time I am writing about a road was being constructed within the limits of the S—K— clan. One of the leading headmen of this clan—call him "A"—had up till that time had a practical monopoly of all contracts and had thereby made a large fortune. Consequently the contract was given to another headman, "B," under whom were working three Punjabi masons, for whose safety he had furnished "security." One night these three masons were all murdered in their camp some distance from the road. The Indian Political Officer, when reporting the incident, wrote that, as these men were "*private servants*" of the contractor, their murder did not concern the Government. It is important here to note the effort made by this official to make out the road as a "Protected Area"—namely, that we were responsible only for matters happening on the road itself—to my mind a weak-kneed, selfish and one-sided policy, and one not deserving of success. And, in the present instance, he, made this report, despite the fact that he knew full well that I had set my face against anything which could be even tacitly construed into a recognition of such areas. When this was pointed out to him, as well as the fact that, as these men were "British subjects," we were doubly responsible, his next effort was perhaps even more illuminating. For, having given the names of the actual murderers and admitted that the reason for this dastardly crime was that the culprits aimed to get the contractor "B" into trouble with the authorities, he went on to say that, as "B" was responsible, under the terms of his agreement, for the safety of these men, he should be made to pay up the "blood money." The "blood money" he assessed at Rs3,000, but pointed out that as "B" was due far more than this sum from the P.W.D. its recovery was a simple matter. It could be deducted from the money due to him. The line of least resistance with a vengeance!

It was then pointed out that his ideas of British justice and mine hardly coincided; that, although "B," under the terms of his agreement, was technically responsible, if his recommendation was agreed to, it would mean that we would be actually carrying out the wishes and objects of the murderers! Certainly a novel form of justice and one more than likely to encourage others to go and do likewise.

The scene now shifts to the Bannu district. In that district the S—K— clan owned certain valuable lands. Being

called in to render assistance, one of the headmen rather cynically remarked, "The murderers certainly belong to our tribe, but not to our section or party. Yet I suppose you want to throw 'tribal responsibility' on to us, because we own lands in British territory and are therefore easy meat!"

"That is not true," was the reply. "But you are headmen of the S—K— tribe. You do receive allowances to assist the Government. You know, and we know, who the actual murderers are and why they committed this crime. All we want is to bring them to justice. It is your duty to assist us. It is only if you refuse to do so that we shall take action against you personally. In fact, we shall do so, then, because by not helping us you will be assisting and harbouring the criminals."

All saw the reasonableness of this argument and answered, "That is fair. If you really want to get the actual murderers, two of their brothers are at the present moment in the Bannu bazaar!"

These were immediately arrested. The "blood money" was paid by the actual murderers and, if rumour was correct, by "A," who was said to have instigated them.

What was the result? The murderers and their headman "A" (if he had instigated them) had not only failed completely in their main object of getting "B" into trouble, but, on the contrary, had had to suffer for their misdeeds. Murder at that price was not worth the candle! "A's" power and influence, together with his prestige with his tribe, for the time, at least, decreased. For, secretly at any rate, his tribesmen were smiling at his discomfiture. While, on the other side of the picture, the power and influence of the headman "B" and those who had given us assistance went up. "It might, after all, pay to be good boys!" The work on the road now went on without a hitch. Not only this clan but others had learnt a salutary lesson.

There were, however, other important lessons to be learnt from this case.

Had we looked upon the road as a "Protected Area" and the masons as "B's" *private servants*, as to some extent they were; or had we even taken up the case and put the fine on the tribe as a whole, or even on to the section to which the murderers belonged (as is so often done under a weak-kneed policy such as "Protected Areas"), would the actual murderers or "A" have really felt it? What, to him, were a few rupees if thereby he attained his object? Furthermore, our ideas of justice might well have been called into account and our prestige thereby have suffered. Other headmen and disgruntled persons with a grudge against the Government, or

against someone else working for the Government, might well have been encouraged to try such intrigues. What did happen? "A" and the tribe at large learnt that loyalty sometimes paid.

Under a policy of "Protected Areas," how can that lesson be taught? It may be possible, but to me it seems that it must be extraordinarily difficult. Under such a policy, surely, there is a danger that the intriguing headman (the headman with "tyrannical tendencies" who wishes to get the power into his own hands), the "badmash" and the discontented tribesman will be encouraged; while, on the other side, the tribe suffers for the sins of a few malcontents and, in turn, becomes discontented.

The better headmen, finding that loyalty does not pay and that to give assistance will probably get them into trouble, if not with the Government then, at any rate, with their own tribesmen, are naturally discouraged. Moreover, not being able to count on adequate support, they either will not, or cannot, give the necessary assistance. These are some of the evils which may come from a weak policy.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE " SANDEMAN SYSTEM " AND A SYSTEM OF " PROTECTED AREAS. "

Not until I found out that not only were some officers arguing that "never had 'tribal responsibility' been more rigidly enforced than just before these 'disturbances,'" but were even going so far as to say that "no real change had taken place in the policy which had proved so successful" did it become apparent that I must try to make quite clear the fundamental differences between the two systems. What was obvious to me was perhaps not so obvious to them.

For instance, it was difficult for me to see how anyone could think that there was any similarity in the two systems when the very name "Protected" in itself not only gives the impression but means—if it means anything—that the *remainder* of the country is left "unprotected."

Such a policy of "Protected Areas," therefore, clearly indicates that we are shirking our responsibilities as regards the remainder of the country—the country as a whole—the very thing which Lord Roberts pointed out we had no right to do when he said, "Having refused to allow them (the tribes) to look to any other Power (for government) except ourselves, we had no right to deny them the protection which our control of the passes implied."

THE ONLY TRUE REMEDY.

At any rate, that a policy of "Protected Areas" is in many ways the very antithesis of the Sandeman system (and therefore of the system which we were trying to spread gradually over the whole of Waziristan in 1923) should be abundantly clear when I point out that, many years ago, my father wrote, "There is only one true remedy and that is to do away with all feeble makeshifts *such as 'Protected Areas'*" (the italics are my own), "and by the exercise of a just and civilizing control secure safety of life and property and the development of the country and its resources. Thus only can we hope to secure the respect of the tribes on both sides of the border and bring them definitely in on our side, a source of strength instead of an ever-present danger."

So, whatever else it may be, a policy of "Protected Areas" can have nothing in common with the Sandeman system. It is, therefore, not the policy of 1923, but a compromise.

Indeed, I can truthfully say that, if there was one thing we stood out against at that time it was any pandering to or recognition of "Protected" as against "Unprotected" areas. That we did this, despite the most strenuous efforts on the part of certain "middlemen," should be clear from the story of "the murder of the three masons."

The way we looked at the question was this: "The primary responsibility for law and order rested on the headmen (the natural leaders of the people), without whose assistance nothing could be done." Ours was to assist them not only in "Protected Areas," but *anywhere* in the country, in so far as this was possible, *vide* Khonia Khel's testimony.

Often did the headmen, when ordered to carry out such duties, say, "We have done our best. We can do no more."

"Possibly, without further assistance from us, you can do no more," was the answer given. "What assistance do you want? Prove that such assistance is necessary and it will be forthcoming." And it was.

The result was that, in almost every case, the headmen were successful in maintaining law and order. But let me reiterate, before they "were ready or able to do so they had to be assured that we, for our part, were ready and willing to assist and protect them *anywhere*."

But did we continue to do so? Perhaps. The very name of "Protected Areas," however, seems to indicate that we did not. And, if not, we cannot expect to have it both ways. We cannot expect to be allowed to shirk our responsibilities and yet secure all the profits.

Once, Lord Kitchener pointed out that “we made use of the headmen when it suited us, then assumed a bullying attitude which they knew was not going to be supported by a ‘fortiter in re’ attitude and which tended to stir up resentment and contempt among the more virile tribesmen and a doubt of our sincerity and fair dealing among the remainder which leads them to believe that, however much we may promise protection, it will not be afforded if it does not appear expedient at the time.”*

May not a policy of “Protected Areas” have led them to the same conclusion—namely, that “under the cloak of ‘Protected Areas’ we would only protect them, *outside* those areas, if it appeared expedient to us at the time”?

When, therefore, I hear it put forward in all seriousness that “there was no real change in the policy,” that “never had tribal responsibility been more rigidly enforced,” I am not altogether surprised to hear once again resuscitated the old, old cry and the old, old excuse that “The Sandeman system is not applicable to the tribes of Waziristan,” despite the testimony of *The Times*, when referring to the success of that policy: “It seems after all the Pathan can be Sandemanized.”

Of course he can be Sandemanized, but only by the *methods* which Sandeman and Jacob and others of their persuasion used.

In this connection, surely, it is rather significant that when General John Jacob brought peace to Sind “the success of his measures,” as testified to by Sir Bartle Frere, “was so complete that it was frequently ascribed to ‘*some difference in the character of the tribes*’”† (the italics are my own).

It may therefore be equally significant that when, after Jacob’s death, the methods he had employed had more or less been allowed to fall into abeyance, there was a change very “greatly for the worse” in the situation.‡

When, therefore, we hear that, even now, some roads are only open on specified days and at specified hours, and others under various restrictions, are we not justified in asking “Are those Sandeman’s methods? Are those his methods of enforcing tribal, territorial and village responsibility? Is that the best the headmen can do even with our assistance?”

Of course, there are differences in the characteristics of the various tribes along the Frontier. There are differences in the characteristics of the English, the Irish, the Welsh and the Scots. But the great beauty of the policy of “Sandemanization”—or “Indirect Rule”—is that it is adaptable to meet all such differences. The principles are exactly the same. But

* Arthur’s “Life of Lord Kitchener.”

† See page 308 of Innes Shand’s “Life of General John Jacob.”

‡ *Ibid.*, page 167.

before you can carry them out you must know the methods by which this can be done. You must not only talk about tribal responsibility, you must know how to enforce it. You must not only know the methods, but you must have faith in them.

Should I be doing an injustice if I were to say that, at the present time, faith in Sandeman's methods is lacking in the North-West Frontier Province? And "where faith fails, all fails."

CHAPTER VII.

Expense of such a Policy.

BUT the expense of such a policy?

You cannot have an Empire without shouldering its responsibilities. "For the welfare of the Pathan clans the Government is responsible," and it is only by the development of the country and its resources that their welfare can be increased and ensured. "Sandeman ruled Baluchistan with few troops and little expenditure. The 'Close Border' failed to rule the Pathan and left him in a state of anarchy." Moreover, it hardly ever stopped fighting or had its hand out of its pocket. The Sandeman policy worked for the benefit of the people. The "Close Border" hardly considered this aspect.

In any great business or engineering scheme it is not only the capital cost which is taken into consideration, but the return that may be expected, or hoped for, on the capital invested. And the same applies to the Frontier. For without prescience there can be no policy, once said Curzon. The question, therefore, is: What return for the money expended can be shown, or, at any rate, can be expected, *over a period of years*? If this be conceded, as it must be, then let us take the allegations and the data on which the critics base their accusations as to the "enormous cost" of the policy.

These consist of:—

- (1) The general cost of the policy as a whole.
- (2) The roads.
- (3) The expense of two large cantonments at Razmak and Wana, as well as the cost of the two strong Corps of "Scouts" and a large number of "khassadars" (tribal levies).
- (4) The locking up of at least two brigades in Waziristan in peace time, especially when, in case of war, they may be more urgently required elsewhere.

Taking these in their order:—

(1) *The General Cost.* One critic, while arguing that the cost of the "present policy" was far too great, did admit that it could "point to the practical abandonment of raiding as proof of success." If by "the present policy" he was alluding

to the policy which proved successful in Waziristan, then I think his admission that it succeeded in putting a stop to "raids" was more than justified. But when, on the other side of the picture, he draws attention to the expenditure entailed I would refer him to *The Statesman's* comment thereon: "The Frontier is in a fair way to become cheap."

But if, when he alludes to "the present policy," he is really referring "to the present policy of 'compromise'" which was subsequently adopted, then I can only agree with him that it did bring about not only an increase in raiding but also a vast increase in expenditure. It is, however, an axiom that a weak policy always brings this in its train; that it invariably leads to an increase in crime, and in the long run to far severer repressive measures than is the case with a strong policy. But the policy of compromise which was subsequently adopted was not the policy of 1923, and I must leave it to those who adopted it to defend.

(2) *Roads* are always expensive, but, in calculating the cost, we must remember that they are a means to an end—the end being the betterment of the tribes. They are productive expenditure. They give employment to the tribesmen and open up trading facilities for them, such as they are. It would indeed be little exaggeration to say that they are the "advance guard" of all progress. But, behind the "advance guard" should come the "main body"—the main progress.

(3) *The expense of two large cantonments at Razmak and Wana with a garrison of at least two brigades, as well as two strong Corps of "Scouts" and a large number of "khassadars" (levies).*

(a) No additional troops have been enlisted in India in order to garrison these places. On the contrary, we know that the Indian Defence Budget "has been cut down to the 'point of risk.'" Indeed, some would say beyond that point.

If they were not stationed at these places, barracks would, I believe, have had to be constructed elsewhere. It would, therefore, be as fair to put down the total cost of these troops on the debit side as it would be to argue that "Hampshire is an unfair charge on England because of Aldershot" (Napier). The only reasonable charge to be put on the debit side would be the *difference* in the cost of construction and the difference in the cost of rationing the troops in these advanced but probably far more healthy stations.

(b) The cost of the two strong Corps of "Scouts." As against their cost must be set off the expense on the old Militias and the difference, only, should be placed on the debit side.

(c) The cost of such a large number of "khassadars." In addition to these "khassadars" giving employment to a large number of tribesmen and therefore adding considerably to the general welfare of the tribes, we must remember that they, in co-operation with the headmen, take the place of the police in the districts.

Provided they carry out their duties—and most onerous ones they are, if done properly—and there is peace both in Waziristan and in the neighbouring districts, they are cheap at the price.

If they do not do so, I agree that their payment might, with some reason, come under the definition of "blackmail." But that is the essence of the Sandeman system. They *must* carry out their duties properly. And they can, and will, do so if adequately supported.

The payment of police is not called "blackmail." Surely the difference between "pay" and "blackmail" in this connection is that "pay" is for work which gives a full return for money spent, while "blackmail" is not. It does not give a full return. Indeed, the accusation of "blackmail" is far more justified where allowances are paid to tribes over whom our control is inadequate—for example, the Mohmands and Afridis.

(4) *The locking up of at least two brigades in Waziristan in peace time, especially when, in case of war, they might be more urgently required elsewhere.* Surely this is a very bad argument. Have we forgotten that, during the last Afghan War, by neglecting our centre, the attack made by Nadir Khan completely dislocated the plans of the General Staff; and how, as a result of this, we were compelled to send an even larger force than the one now operating in Waziristan to deal with the situation?

Have we forgotten that, during the Great War, Marshal Lyautey was able to denude Morocco of regular troops? Why? Because during his administration he had made the Moroccan tribesmen into his friends.

It is only common sense to say that, if the tribesmen had really become our friends, instead of having to be always on the watch against an ever-present danger we should be in a much stronger and more satisfactory position. Indeed, in that case, even if it were not possible to decrease the Waziristan garrison, we should certainly not have to reinforce it.

That, surely, is the moral of Lyautey's story. That it is no idle dream is also borne out by the fact that, during the time I am speaking of, the garrison of Waziristan was decreased for purposes of internal security in India. Moreover, I think I am right in saying that, during the debacle in Peshawar in

1931, both "Scouts" and "Frontier Constabulary," if not troops, were sent from the Waziristan district to assist in quelling the disturbances in that area.

If, on the contrary, they were our enemies or we could not in any way trust them, what then? Then we should not be in a position to decrease our garrison and indeed would be very fortunate if we had not to reinforce it. But that would almost certainly be our position whether we occupied Waziristan or not.

Now let us turn to the other side of the balance sheet.

I have seen it computed that the average cost of punitive expeditions on the Frontier over a number of years has been over a million pounds a year, and that out of this Waziristan certainly contributed more than its fair share.

Be that as it may, there can at least be little doubt that between 1917 and 1921 the cost of expeditions in Waziristan must have been a million pounds. The bill for 1936-37 has not yet been made up,* but it will certainly come to over a million and that at a time when India can ill afford it.

The expenditure on Waziristan between 1923 and 1933 was certainly heavy, but it was mostly, if not entirely, used on productive works for the development of the country. The roads, for instance, are still there! Moreover, it did bring a longer period of peace to Waziristan and the neighbouring districts than they had enjoyed for many a long day. While on the subject of expense—they called forth from *The Statesman* the comment that "The Frontier is well on the way to become cheap."

What the *additional* expenditure on Waziristan, from 1923 to 1933, was—on roads, increased allowances to headmen and "khassadars," etc.—I do not know. But the approximate additional expenditure could be made out, and I wonder how the *total* would compare with the cost of even one expedition!

And is it really too much to say that, had it not been that Waziristan was "contentedly quiet" during those troublous years on other parts of the Frontier—for example, in 1931—there would have been great danger that she also might have joined in and an expedition have been necessary? It is, of course, impossible to say for certain, but that was undoubtedly the opinion of some of the Frontier officers who were on the spot and therefore in a position to know.

What, then, we have to ask ourselves is whether if a quarter of the money now being spent on smashing the tribes had been spent on "productive" works for their benefit, it would not have been far cheaper in the long run. To bring peace, happiness and prosperity to these tribesmen is surely worth the spending of a few rupees—even of many rupees.

* The cost up to the end of October, 1937, was £1,200,000, and by now is certainly much greater!

If I am right in believing—as I do believe—that had we carried on the Sandemanization of Waziristan to its logical conclusion and *continued* to develop the country for the benefit of the tribes, instead of reverting to a policy of compromise, with most of the defects of the old “Close Border” system, we should not have been forced once more into the old and pernicious system of punitive expeditions, then my reader will doubtless agree with me that whatever the expenditure incurred in winning the tribes to our side, it would have been well worth while.

That, then, is the question. Was this expedition necessary? Is it impossible to win these tribesmen over to our side? I believe it is not impossible, and that Frontier expeditions should not be necessary—for reasons I shall give later.

Lord Curzon once pointed out very truly that our troubles on the Frontier were nearly always the outcome of “mistakes in the initial stages.” Probably it was so in the present case. The expedition became necessary because of “initial” mistakes and because we did not carry on our former “methods.”

CHAPTER VIII.

Government's Terms to the Waziristan Tribes, 1937.

SINCE writing the foregoing the Government's terms to the Waziristan tribes have been announced. And it is something to think that the " extent of the ' Protected Areas ' " is being increased. But it will be a good thing for us and still better for the tribes if, as a result of this, we prove to them once and for all that their interests are ours and that we are out to help them to help themselves. For the day that we do this they themselves will ask that " such feeble makeshifts as ' Protected Areas ' " may be done away with. " How do you like the British? We are like birds in the jungle and know nothing. We have no corn to eat and are hungry," asked the Wazir headmen of the Bugti chiefs, to which the latter gave answer, " We were more jungle birds than you when first the British Government took charge of us. We are now happy and contented and do not wish to return to the jungle." Are we right, then, in thrusting them back into the jungle?

We have also called upon the tribes to surrender 2,000 rifles. And, provided these rifles (and good ones at that) are surrendered, so much the better. But when talking of a total disarmament of the tribes, it is as well to remember that it would be no easy matter to carry this out. For it is a good axiom never to give an order to the Frontier tribes without first considering " Suppose they refuse to carry it out, are we ready to *force* them to do so? " For, with the psychology of the Pathan to be taken into consideration, force them to do so you must. If there is any doubt about it, then don't give the order.

DISARMAMENT.

Moreover, there is nothing new about this question of " disarmament." It was fully considered after the adoption of the Waziristan policy. In dealing with the question, however, there are several matters which have to be considered.

(1) For example, at the time I am speaking of, the very fact that the Mahsuds and Wazirs were behaving themselves so well rendered the question of disarmament difficult. Disarmament seemed hardly a suitable or just *reward* for their good behaviour! All that could be done, therefore, was that, wherever possible, fines imposed should be paid for in the shape of

rifles. And this was generally done. The fact that they continued to behave well, however, made the numbers received not very large!

(2) Possibly if the Government had called in arms and offered a reasonable price for them it might have paid in the long run. But the initial cost would have been great. And what if there had been no ready response?

(3) But the strongest argument of all, on the subject of disarmament, hardly seems to have been considered at all. And that is that "if you disarm a tribe which, to a certain extent, is dependent on arms for its own protection, the onus of giving them protection and security falls on you." There can then be no question of "Protected Areas"! You have assumed the responsibility for law and order and, without adequate control of the country, you cannot ensure peace and, unless you can do so, you surely have no moral justification for entirely disarming the tribes.

Perhaps, therefore, the two following stories may illustrate more clearly than anything else the main points which should be considered in reviewing the question of the possible disarmament of the tribes.

(i) About 1919-21, when raiding into the D.I.K. district had reached alarming proportions, Government arms and ammunition were issued to the villages along and indeed well inside the border. Raiding, however, still went on as merrily as ever. For reasons which it is unnecessary to go into here, raiding suddenly ceased in 1923-24. Subsequent inquiries, however, substantiated the fact that the arms issued had had little or no effect on the situation. They had hardly ever been used against raiders. They had, in certain cases, been used to assist them and, still more often, in crimes of violence within the district itself! Moreover, quite a brisk trade in the sale of ammunition to the tribes had been going on! Personally—in a long experience of the Frontier—I have rarely, if ever, found the issue of arms for the protection of the villages prove successful. The very fact that you have had to issue them indicates that your prestige has sunk very low. For is it not, after all, putting on to the people the maintenance of the peace of the border—the maintenance of law and order—which is the Government's primary duty? That does not, however, mean that the villages are to be freed from their paramount duty of turning out "chighas" (hue-and-cry parties) in case of raids. But, for this, no great number of arms is required. What is required is accurate and *timely* information. And that, believe me, you will only get when the prestige of authority is high—never when it is low.

Be that as it may. As soon as raiding ceased, it was the

villagers themselves who asked that the Government arms should be taken away. And this was done with no evil results. Indeed, crime still further decreased! Why did the villagers make this request? Because the arms were no longer necessary. Do away with the cause and arms invariably decrease of themselves. One does not carry a revolver in Bond Street, although one might carry one in Chicago.

(ii) Much the same lesson was taught me in Waziristan. When matters had settled down there I remember well a meeting I had with a wild Adur Rahman Khel Mahsud. The Adur Rahman Khel are one of the most lawless of all the Mahsud clans, and this man's rifle was almost certainly his most cherished possession. Magnificently armed and bristling with cartridges, I was amazed to hear him say, "Now that the Sarkar has given us peace, the next thing you must do is to take this away," and here he tapped the butt of his rifle. Mark, however, that he did not say, "Take away our rifles and there will be peace." No; his meaning was quite clear, as was that of the D.I.K. villagers, "First give peace and then rifles will no longer be necessary."

So when we talk so glibly of a general disarmament of the tribes ought we not to recognize that we really have no justification for disarming them until we have given them peace? And *that* we can only give them by controlling the whole country. That is "the only true remedy."

Perhaps in this connection the widow's criticism of Mahmud of Ghazni might have its lesson, even for us to-day.

"In one of the outlying parts of the dominion he had conquered, a caravan was looted by robbers. The mother of one of the merchants complained to Mahmud. Mahmud urged the impossibility of keeping order in such an out-of-the-way part of the country. 'Why, then, do you take countries that you cannot govern and for the protection of which you will have to answer on the Day of Judgment?' answered the widow. Mahmud, recognizing the strength of her argument, sent a force and saw that justice was done."

Are we not equally responsible for the protection of the Pathan clans, be they inside or across the border? And shall we not have to answer the same question?

For "ultimately the tribes will be absorbed. Can anyone predict any other destiny for them?" And would he if he could? For what does this so-called independence mean? It means, for the majority, chaos and anarchy, injustice and suffering. This does not mean rushing matters. Spread our influence, make the tribesmen our friends, and the other will follow as the night follows the day.

CHAPTER IX.

Roads a Means to an End and not an End in Themselves.

IN January, 1936, I stressed the same point in connection with the "roads" when I said, "In Waziristan, if we stand content with the roads and fail to develop the country and its resources for the benefit of the tribes, we shall be failing in our mission." At the same time I went on to say that, "It was a mistaken idea to think that it was the roads which had quietened Waziristan, whereas it was the whole policy of civilization, of which the roads were an important but by no means an all-important part."

That, indeed, was, I believe, one of the great mistakes we made.

It was not till the Waziristan tribes recognized that we were out to help them to help themselves that their whole attitude changed and they became reconciled not only to the roads but to our control. But once they had recognized this, it was the tribes themselves who began to ask that roads should be constructed in their own areas.

Why, then, did the attitude of the tribes again alter? Was it that they considered that the benefits which they had looked for were not forthcoming?

When the writer was leaving Waziristan, the headmen voiced their confidence and their hopes that the many schemes proposed "for the advancement and welfare of the tribes" would bear fruit.

But, if *Truth's* correspondent is right in saying that little has been done to increase the cultivable area, that water has been decreasing each year to an appreciable extent, and that vegetation has also diminished, can it be said that their hopes have been fulfilled?

When we first took over control of Waziristan in 1919-20, the demands for wood for the various garrisons were necessarily large and brought profits to the tribes. But on the other side of the picture was the transparent fact that the forests were being very rapidly and very wastefully denuded and that something ought to be done to rectify this. What has been done to conserve these forests and to stop this wasteful denudation which is very probably one of the main reasons for the decrease in the water supply? And what other schemes have been carried out for the "betterment" of the tribes as a

whole? Has anything been done in this direction or have these been shelved on the excuse that "to carry them out would be interfering with the independence of the tribes"?

Again, instead of getting the tribes themselves to ask for the construction of new roads by first proving to them the great benefits other tribes and other sections had obtained from them—as was certainly what we aimed at doing from 1923 to 1928—may we not have been inclined, latterly at any rate, to try to force on them the roads without the benefits?

That at least is the question. What the answer is I cannot say for certain. But it would rather seem that the tribesmen had not been very convinced of the benefits if *Truth's* correspondent is correct in saying, "In 1933 it was decided to establish a fresh post in the Khaisora-Shakdu [Shaktu] area to be connected by road in such a way that this area would be brought under control"—a very good idea, provided the "control" was not only to be for our benefit but for the benefit of the tribes concerned. But as "in each case" the action taken by us "met with hostilities," the proofs of our beneficent intentions do not seem to have been very convincing.

Is this also not borne out by *The Times'* own correspondent's article of the 22nd May, 1937, in which it is admitted "the policy now being carried out is to obtain the consent of the tribesmen to the building of roads in their territory, to a cantonment of troops in a few selected places and the right of unmolested access to all parts of the country by Government officers and forces." The italics are my own. By all means let Political Officers have free access into the country. Indeed this is absolutely essential. But, provided they make friends with the tribes and their headmen, they will be welcomed. There should be no necessity for written agreements about this. But let "*the forces*" be kept as much in the background as possible. Used, certainly, whenever and wherever necessary, but let the necessity always be proved first. "Draw me not without a cause, sheathe me not without honour," was the famous inscription on a certain Oriental scimitar, and holds good with these tribesmen.

Indeed, where this correspondent goes on to say that the present policy is "in effect a compromise between the Forward policy . . . and the Close Border," that is just what it appears to be, for it most certainly is not the Sandeman system, nor is it, I believe, the system which was proving so successful in Waziristan. "Prove first the benefits of our occupation, and the benefits of the roads, and the tribesmen will ask for them themselves." That is what they did in Sandeman's time and that is what they were beginning to do in a most marked manner between 1923 and 1928.

It is a well-known fact that Political Officers, moving about in tribal areas, under tribal escort and under the tribal responsibility of the tribal headmen, are usually far safer than if accompanied by troops. And this is true of all such tribes.

How true this is is shown in that intensely interesting book about another road, "The Road through Kurdistan," by Hamilton, in a Foreword to which General Rowan-Robinson bears tribute to how this engineer of the P.W.D., "in the successful pursuit of a great material aim, had unconsciously won the moral battle" over the Kurdish tribesmen. The battle is not always to the strong. Indeed, on one occasion when the Assyrian levies, told off to guard the workmen, arrived they found the work already in progress. The moral victory had already been won, or, at any rate, was well on its way.

It will, I know, be argued that we did "obtain the consent of the tribes" to the construction of these new roads. All that can be said is that a consent which "in every case led to hostilities" does not seem to have been a very convincing one, nor the type of consent which Sandeman aimed at.

Is it not possible that there was rather too much of "the mailed fist" showing through "the velvet glove"? For remember that wild tribesmen, be they Kurds or dwellers in Waziristan, are intensely proud and, though, as in the case of the latter tribes, they may have lost, or are gradually losing, their independence, they do not like this fact rammed down their throats at the point of the bayonet.

"Peaceful penetration" requires "peaceful persuasion." The tribes want to be persuaded that the roads are for their benefit and not solely for ours. They do not want the troops first and then the road. That is putting the cart before the horse. If the troops are to go, let them go subsequently as friends. Many a time did the troops go to Ladha, on the Razmak-Wana road, and, in one case at least, it was the tribesmen themselves who guarded the large advance dump of supplies and stores before the arrival of the troops, and yet not one grain was lost. How many troops preceded the making of the road between Sarwekai and Wana; and how many that between Razmak and Wana, or was their successful construction due to the justice and impartiality of the magnificent little band of "Sapper" officers who worked there?

Yet, be it noted, not one word is said about the tribal point of view, or what added benefits the tribe as a whole is to obtain from these new roads; nor whether their construction is to mean that the benefits of civilization are to be extended to the uttermost parts of the country. All that is clear is that another "Protected Area"—another new road "under control"—is to be added.

When Hamilton says in his book that "the two main reasons" for roads "are trade and administration" he is correct. And equally so when he argues that "the wildest people are pretty sure to become peaceful by copying the civilized modes of life." Nor will anyone deny that "Empires that rely purely on military conquest usually fail to hold their people together." But, to obtain these results, some sort of administration, as well as encouragement of trade, is necessary.

Many a time were Sandeman and my father asked why it was that tribe after tribe asked to be taken over. Perhaps the answer may be given in the old Chinese saying, "Where there is justice in one state and tyranny in the neighbouring one, the women of the latter will be seen carrying their children on their backs as well as their goods and chattels and fleeing into the former," for where justice reigns 'tis freedom to obey.

Setting aside for the moment the intensely interesting description of his beloved road and of the tribesmen whom, despite all their faults, he came to love, perhaps one of the most interesting, although one of the saddest descriptions in Hamilton's book is that of an interview he had with the great Kurdistan chief, Ismail Beg, who "had used his great influence to convince his people of the benefits of the road" by pointing out to them that "until roads were built Kurdistan would never prosper," but, in the end, had, for reasons fully given, been bitterly disappointed with the results.

Some of Ismail Beg's arguments, and even accusations, are so relevant to the subject of roads in tribal territory that I should like to have had the space to have given this interview in full. But I must confine myself to a few quotations.

"The Kurds," he said, "have been crushed by your Air Power, yet never has there been any inquiry into the source of the trouble. Surely you can see there must have been some cause for dissatisfaction." (Have we inquired fully into this aspect of the Waziristan affair?)

And again: "You have told us that your road would bring trade and we believed you. But what are the first articles of commerce we see on it? An army and ammunition, aeroplane bombs and machine guns to crush us!"

"By encouraging the development of the country wonders might have been achieved, without wasting money on warfare that can only bring misery." So spoke Ismail Beg.

Ismail Beg is dead, murdered by his enemies. Another great Kurdistan chief, who assisted Hamilton, surrendered to the Turks rather than to the Irak Government! But was there no truth in the former's words? Hamilton certainly thought there was. And I wonder whether some of his arguments might not equally apply to Waziristan to-day.

After the tribal rising of 1897 Sir Robert Warburton wrote these sad words: " My heart is very heavy over this disaster which I feel could have been staved off. . . . It makes me quite sad to think how easily the labour of years—of a lifetime—can be ruined and destroyed," and, feeling the same, I can only say " Was it necessary?" or rather " Would it have been necessary but for our initial mistakes?"

THE ROADS THEMSELVES A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE.

May not the roads themselves even have been, in some measure, a contributory cause of our present troubles? We looked on the roads and saw that they were good. And they were very good. But, unfortunately, from this very fact was, I believe, generated the entirely mistaken idea that it was the roads—and the roads almost alone—which had brought peace to Waziristan.

If my readers doubt this, let them read any of the articles and reports on Waziristan subsequent to 1923, and they will find that the primary reason given for the success of the Waziristan policy during this period was always " Roads, roads, and again roads! " Having, as it was thought, ensured the safety of the roads, did we not lose sight of what was happening in other parts of the country and begin to forget that the roads were merely a means to an end—a way to better things—the better things being increased agriculture, employment, conservation of forests and all the other benefits which should always accompany a policy of civilization?

The danger of our making such a mistake was noted by me many years ago when I wrote, " We have, of late, gone a long way towards the Sandemanization of Waziristan and the establishment of law and order. But let us never forget that we have a distinct moral obligation towards the tribes. . . . There is a great danger of our forgetting this." And that danger was voiced somewhat caustically by some of the headmen when they said, " Had the success of the policy not been so great, it is possible we might have received even greater benefits. It does not always pay to be good!"

Indeed, the mistaken idea that roads were the complete solution of the Frontier problem almost certainly contributed to our troubles with other tribes. We started a road into the Afridi country and lost prestige by giving it up on the first threat of trouble—a fatal mistake when dealing with such people as Pathans. We made a road into the Mohmand country. But, without " control," what permanent good could these roads do to the tribes? To some of the headmen, in the way of pecuniary benefits, yes. To the tribesmen as a whole, no. To ourselves, one benefit it did give: it made it easier to attack the tribe. And, doubtless, we shall find the roads

will make it easier to cow the recalcitrant Waziristan tribes—although we seem to be taking a long time about it! But if our object is to make these tribesmen our friends, this is no great or permanent advantage.

Unless, therefore, we intend to take over effective administrative control, roads are, surely, merely an added bone of contention. Every headman, every section, wants a share in the contracts, and a share in the monetary benefits. Not getting a share, he, or they, will intrigue against those who have and endless trouble will be caused. If you control the country and can deal effectively with such intrigues and keep order, no harm is done (*vide* my story of the murder of the three masons). That, at any rate, was my experience in Waziristan. But, if not, remember Chatham's wise dictum, "I will be responsible for nothing I do not control."

DEFINITION OF " CONTROL."

By "control" I do not mean "Protected Areas." But neither do I mean, as so many seem to think and fear, that such a policy of control necessitates that "their hills are to be dotted about with barracks and forts [are we doing too much of this?] and their villages provided with magistrates, tax-gatherers and lawyers. But it implies that the Government shall appoint qualified agents to represent to the tribes the authority of the King-Emperor; men who can go among them and be umpires and arbiters, when required, between clan and clan. . . . The duties of such agents may or may not be called administration. Nothing is gained in the discussion by mere names. The clans need very little of what is called administration, but the little that they do need must be of the best." These words were written many years ago, but do they not hold good up to this day?

What is required is the free "access" of British Political Officers to all parts of the country—not by force, or, rather, by the "moral force" of their personal knowledge and sympathy with the tribes. For, as Sandeman said, "it is the personal influence that is born of intimate knowledge and sympathy which is the chief factor of success," and it is this personal influence which will make them welcome to the tribesmen "because they know they are out for their welfare." It is this personal contact which will win over the tribes and nothing else.

But to obtain this personal influence, and this knowledge and sympathy, let them always remember John Lawrence's advice to John Nicholson when he took over charge of the Bannu district: "Eschew 'middlemen': they are the curse of the country."

Or, in the words of Kipling, "But first you must master their language, their dialect, proverbs and songs. Don't trust any clerk* to interpret when they come with the tale of their wrongs. Let them know that you know what they're saying, let them feel that you know what they say. Yes, even when you want to go hunting, hear 'em out if it takes you all day."

But that is merely to say that "personal influence" gained by "personal contact" is the essence of all Frontier policy. Have, then, these characteristics been lost by our officers? No, not if they are given a fair chance. If they were given a fair chance and encouraged, we should find how true were Curzon's words when he said, "I believe that all along the Frontier we are capable of finding scores of men . . . capable of winning, or who have already won, the confidence and affection of the tribes, men who know their language and are in sympathy with their customs. . . . I put my whole faith in the work of such men and I believe that our security rests, not upon the numbers of battalions we place there, but upon the individual character of the men we choose."

If, however, these attributes are not forthcoming, may it not be that there is still some truth in the saying that "The frequency of punitive expeditions is accounted for by the fact that tribal management by peaceful means and on lines that would—gradually, it may be, but surely—obviate the necessity for them, has never received the encouragement and attention it deserves"?

In short, control the country—make roads—stop tribal feuds—encourage the tribesmen to come to you with their troubles—and have faith in your mission of bringing peace and prosperity to those who are so badly in need of it. A policy based on these principles is deserving of success and must succeed in the long run.

But make no mistake about it. Permanent peace will never be achieved by a policy of taking much and giving little in exchange, which is what a policy of "Protected Areas" really means.

That way lies not peace, but a sword.

* "Clerk" or "Middleman"—A rose by any other name would smell as sweet!

CHAPTER X.

What is meant by “ Supporting ” the Headmen.

It may be said—and indeed is being said—that, when the military first entered the Khaisora Valley, they went there in support of the headmen. When we entered the Mohmand country we said the same. I do not say, for a moment, that this was untrue. But was this the support they really wanted? Or, rather, was it not too late? The fact that the troops were attacked in force—if not ambushed—seems to point to the conclusion that it was.

What the headmen really want is the active support of the political authorities in the everyday control of their tribes. What, for instance, did the chief mean when he said to Sandeman that he had power over his tribe *only* if the Sarkar’s hand was on his back? • He meant, “ If you support me, make it worth my while, and prove, not only to me, but also to my tribe, that loyalty pays, then, I can do anything.”

That is the crux of the whole matter. “ Loyalty must pay.” But have we always proved that it does?

Surely the very fact that we are producing this same old threadbare excuse—“ The headmen have lost their power”—as a reason for the present “ rising ” casts some doubts on this?

By “ support ” I do not mean military support. I mean that moral and material support which the political and civil authorities alone can, and are in a position to, give.

Admittedly, the present “ rising ” could only have occurred through a failure on the part of the headmen to carry out their duties and control their tribes. But was their failure and the decrease in their power due to any lack of support on our part, as was the allegation made, in like circumstances, by the headmen of the Kohat district in 1921—an allegation which subsequent events proved largely to have been justified? For, no sooner was their power and influence resuscitated on the old foundations than peace once more reigned in the district, as statistics will amply prove.

The blame for the present “ rising ”—if blame there is—can in no way be thrown on to the military forces in occupation of Waziristan. Law and order are not, and must never become, a military duty.

If anyone is to blame in Waziristan then the blame must

rest on the civil and political authorities, as well as on the headmen, who were not able to keep the tribes in order.

But even this may be, and I believe is, attributable to other causes for which they are either in no way, or at any rate only partially, to blame.

With this aspect of the question I will deal later.

Although it is correct to say that behind the civil authorities stand the Army and the Air Force, it must always be remembered that it is the civil and political authorities, both inside and across the Frontier, who are responsible for the maintenance of the peace of the border. It is they, and they alone, who can give the necessary support to the headmen in discharging their duties. The military authorities can only assist and support the headmen if, and when, they are called on to do so by the civil authorities.

“The best Political Officer,” once said the late Lord Lytton, “is not he who puts down raids, but he who has no raids to put down.” And equally true is it to say that “the best Political Officer is often the man who has the least occasion to call on either the military or the air force for assistance”; in fact, the man who, in my father’s words, “has got his political arrangements into such good working order that he is able to dispense with their active assistance and thus avoid expeditions.”

I have tried to show how the policy which was so successful in Baluchistan was built on the “existing frameworks” of the tribal organization and tribal customs, the very foundation of which is “the recognition and support of the tribal maliks (headmen)”; how a policy, built on the same foundations in Waziristan in 1922-23, brought peace not only to that country but to the districts along its border.

That this was so was amply testified to when a number of Congress and other political leaders visited Dera Ismail Khan, where they were expecting their Hindu brethren to be much in favour of “Reforms,” only to be met with the trenchant and caustic reply, “We happen to be up against facts and know that, only a year or so ago, owing to a weakening of authority, raids into the district from across the border numbered one a day; that nearly all the Hindus fled from the villages into the walled towns and even there went in terror of their lives. Now there is peace and no raiding. Reforms! We want no reforms which are in any way likely to weaken the administration. What we want is a strong administration and, if necessary, more British officers!”

But facts and realities are always convincing, especially to those who are called on to suffer. And I wonder if the Hindus of that district, who have again had to suffer so much from

the depredations of the tribesmen, might not be able to give eloquent testimony—if they were not afraid to do so—as to what were the real causes of the present troubles and the reason for this weakening of authority. I think they would agree that there were many other ways, and many other outside influences, by which the power of the headmen and the local authorities had been undermined.

EXISTING FRAMEWORKS.

For instance, the “existing frameworks” on which Sandeman and others of his persuasion built were the District and Political Officers, as well as the headmen. The corner-stone of the administration on the Frontier—as it is all over India—is the District Officer, the man to whom the poor man has always looked for justice. Weaken the power of the District Officer and you are laying an axe at the foundations of law and order. In like manner, the corner-stone of the tribal organization is the headman, whether inside or across the border, and he is the man to whom the District and Political Officers have always looked for assistance in maintaining the peace of the districts and the peace of the border. Weaken the power of the headman and fail to support him when he is deserving of support, and you are laying an axe at the foundations of the tribal organization and completely undermining the “existing frameworks” and, to do this, if Marshal Lyautey was right, “inevitably leads to anarchy.” And it would be idle to say that the recent happenings in India, and elsewhere, have not had this effect.

THE FRONTIER PROBLEM AN ECONOMIC RATHER THAN A MILITARY PROBLEM.

It is a truism to say that the Frontier problem is far more an economic than a military one. Yet, do we always act as if we remembered this?

For example, believing, despite every assertion to the contrary, that there is not a tribe on the North-West Frontiers of India which is not dependent on “the settled districts” for many of the necessities of life, I am firmly convinced that, even from the economic point of view alone, Lord Lansdowne was right when he said, “I am persuaded that under a decent system of Frontier administration recourse to military expeditions ought never to occur.”

What did Lord Lansdowne mean by this? He meant that “under a decent system of Frontier administration both the tribesmen and their leaders would find that it would be profitable if they behaved themselves.” In short, that loyalty paid.

But he meant more than this. He meant that “their dependence on the districts was so great and placed so strong a lever in our hands, that we could not only compel the headmen to maintain law and order but force the tribesmen, also, to do so. And, in addition, that we could give the headmen the necessary political support to make them able to do so.”

Why, then, have we had to revert to the old and pernicious policy of expeditions? It is because we have not been using that power.

In February, 1936, I wrote: “Why, then, has this economic pressure not been utilized, or, when utilized to the extent even of a blockade, why has it so often proved a failure? The reason is that complete and accurate knowledge of how the tribes ‘live, move and have their being’ is absolutely essential. In short, knowledge is power and, too often, the necessary knowledge by which alone that pressure can be adequately exercised is lacking.”

When, therefore, I am told that the headmen—and, at least, by implication the civil authorities—have no power, my mind carries me back to 1902, when some of these same Tori Khels—who are giving so much trouble now—were found to have taken part with other clans in a “raid” on one of the Border Police posts, in the Bannu district. Their portion of the blood-money and fine had been assessed at Rs3,000. Their headmen had refused either to come in or settle up. We were told by “middlemen”—against the use of whom so many Frontier officers have warned us—that, as this tribe lived entirely across the border, it would be difficult, if not impossible, without a military expedition, to compel them to do so.

Such, however, did not prove to be the case. Patient investigation and the knowledge gained thereby proved successful. A month went by, two months passed, and still the Tori Khels made no move. Was it, then, untrue that they were dependent on British territory? No. At last, information came through that they could hold out no longer and that a “bahir” (caravan) had started down the Khaisora Valley—the valley which has figured so largely in the present operations—to attend the weekly “fair” at Bannu. Being, however, suspicious of our intentions, they were, it was reported, making a bit of a detour on entering the district. Collecting a certain number of police and “Border sowars,” we went out to meet them. It will suffice here to say that we were successful in rounding up the caravan, some ten miles out, and bringing them into Bannu.

A few days later the Tori Khel headmen came rushing into Bannu and matters were settled to our, if not entirely to the Tori Khels’, satisfaction. The cattle were sold, the fine was

paid and the Tori Khels gave "security" for their future good behaviour. And for many years afterwards this tribe gave little or no trouble.

Now, if this could be done in 1902, when our troops were not in control of Waziristan—when the Tori Khels were not encircled by roads—surely it is only common sense to say that it should have been far easier to do so now and "recourse to a military expedition should not have been necessary"?

I could cite many other examples to prove that *every* tribe along the border is economically dependent on the "settled districts," but, perhaps, this one, as it applies to the actual tribe with whom we are now dealing, will suffice.

ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE.

I would only add that, in the February, 1936, number of the *Indian Empire Review*, in writing about the Mohmands, I said in this connection, "Again and again have I been told . . . that such-and-such a tribe is not economically dependent on us. And again and again have I proved this to be false." All along the Charsadda border and even in parts of the Mardan Sub-Division there are living men of the Mohmand tribe. And since the Swat Canal was made their numbers have largely increased. I shall be told, "Oh, these men have nothing to do with their fellow-tribesmen across the border," or "They belong to the friendly tribes." That is what the "middlemen" will doubtless tell me. But inquire farther and you will find whole villages inhabited by both the Baizai and Khwaizai clansmen—the two most recalcitrant of all the Mohmand clans!

"Dependent on the districts for salt and many of the other necessities of life; on the wood trade down the Swat and Kabul Rivers and on transit dues; also on the carrying trade; with many of their tribesmen settled in the districts and many more flocking into them for labour, is it not common sense to believe that, as the years have passed and the aspirations and standards of living of the tribesmen have risen, so also has their dependence on the districts increased," and with their dependence our economic stranglehold upon them?

Swatis of Nindahar and Allai, even the tribes of distant Kohistan; Mohmands and tribes of the Swat Valley; Afridi and Orakzai; Wazir and Mahsud—all of them, despite the most solemn assurances of "middlemen" to the contrary, I found were dependent in varying degree on the "settled" districts for many of the necessities of life.

Then why was it that the civil authorities were unable to bring the Tori Khels to their senses long ere this, without recourse to an expedition? Why is it that the Tori Khel headmen have lost their power and influence?

May it not be because, in the interim, we have been "voluntarily abandoning the means and destroying the machinery" by which that knowledge could be acquired and by which that pressure could be brought to bear effectively?

CHAPTER XI.

The Outlaw Problem.

THE example of the Tori Khels, given in the last chapter, as well as a study of "the outlaw problem" and how it can best be dealt with, will, I think, go a long way not only to explain the *methods* which must be employed if success is to be achieved, but will also show how we have, in the interim, been abandoning both the means and the machinery by which alone this could be done.

We will take the "outlaw problem" first.

THE OUTLAW PROBLEM.

It is an axiom that no raid occurs in the "settled districts" without the active and passive assistance of people inside the districts concerned. It is, indeed, because nearly every tribal raiding gang is accompanied by local district outlaws that they so often prove successful. Assisted by their friends and relations—and, too often if it pays them by headmen and "middle-men"—their information is so complete and up to date that large profits are often to be made out of the business.

If that be the case, then success in putting an end to tribal raiding can only be achieved if the outlaw question is tackled and this can only be done by information even more complete and up to date than that possessed by these gangs.

Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the man who understands the outlaw problem and the methods of dealing with it is well on the way to the solution of the Frontier problem, because, if raiding gangs will *not* operate without outlaws, if outlaws will *not* operate without assistance from inside the districts, then do away with such assistance and raiding must and does cease. In short, if there were no outlaws there would be few, if any, raids. And if there were no raids there would be no Frontier problem! And it was because this outlaw problem was successfully dealt with in Waziristan and the neighbouring districts that raiding did cease during the years mentioned. It no longer paid! The outlaw, being no longer a source of profit but of loss, was no longer a popular hero and, getting no assistance and being hard pressed, he surrendered.

THE OUTLAW. "

An outlaw is a man who has committed a heinous offence in "British territory and has fled across the border" into the tribal area. There he usually becomes the "hamsaya" of some tribal headman—or "one who dwells beneath his shade" or protection. It is, however, a mistake to think that the headman gives his "protection" purely from philanthropic motives or because, to do so, is in conformity with Pathan custom. It is equally a mistake to think that the outlaw has not to pay—and to pay through the nose—for such "shade"! It is, indeed, very often because he has no other means of paying his so-called protector except by illicit gains that he is forced to join a "raiding gang." Having joined a "gang," it can be pictured how all-important becomes the outlaw's local knowledge to them and the assistance he can thereby procure in the districts. And that is why the raiding gangs will never give away the names of the outlaws accompanying them if they can possibly avoid it.

HOW THE OUTLAW PROBLEM CAN BE DEALT WITH.

What is the remedy? Make outlawry and the harbouring of outlaws across the border, and assisting them *inside the districts*, not a paying proposition and raiding invariably ceases. At any rate, that is what I have always found in a long experience of the Frontier.

How can this be done?

(1) By finding out who are the outlaws operating with each gang.

(2) Who are the headmen or others harbouring them across the border and, most important of all:

(3) Who are the men assisting them *inside* the districts.

Then take stern action against the culprits. Easy to say but not always so easy to do, because too often through faulty and slack investigation in the initial stages these essential particulars are not ascertained. So no action *can* be taken either against the outlaw himself or his harbourers and abettors. Nor *can* the terms of the tribal agreements with the Government, of which one of the conditions is invariably either the surrender or the expulsion of outlaws, be enforced.

And if this cannot be done and if these terms cannot be enforced, then tribal, territorial and village responsibility—the very essence of the Sandeman system—becomes a dead letter. Better no agreement at all than one which you are unable or unwilling to enforce!

METHODS TO BE ADOPTED FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF TRIBAL,
TERRITORIAL AND VILLAGE RESPONSIBILITY.

These, then, were the levers which we had in our hands when we took over control of Waziristan. But before they could be made use of we had to obtain the information which was lacking—and without which the necessary pressure could not be brought to bear.

We had to know more about the outlaw than he knew about us!

How this was done may be of interest to my reader.

In giving an account of some of the *methods* employed and the procedure adopted I do so in no egotistical spirit, but because I am convinced that it is no use giving lip-service to the *principles* which animated such men as Sandeman and Lyautey unless, at the same time, we understand the *methods* which they employed to bring these principles to fruition.

Careful investigation first of all demonstrated the truth of the axiom enumerated above, namely, that “not only were the tribal agreements on the subject of outlaws not being enforced,” but, what was much worse, “no real efforts were being made to obtain the necessary particulars” about these gentry. Indeed, once an outlaw had crossed the border his whereabouts were more often than not entirely unknown.

Here, then, was the procedure adopted to rectify this. A complete list of all outlaws was prepared, together with their past histories and their genealogical trees. Their present whereabouts in the tribal area were then ascertained and the names of the headmen with whom they were harbouring.

When all these particulars had been obtained—and to obtain them entailed the closest personal supervision and hard work—then, and not till then, were we in a position to take the necessary action.

Perhaps an amusing description of this type of outlaw-register, when it was adopted with great success in the Kohat district in 1921—and now with equal success in Waziristan and the neighbouring districts—may be instructive. In describing this register a correspondent in *The Civil and Military Gazette*—or was it *The Pioneer*?—wrote: “This patent outlaw-register is a fearsome, gruesome thing. . . . Herein stand hieroglyphics, acrostics, cross-references, unintelligible to all save the initiated. Herein stand data and details of outlaws, their friends and relations, their haunts and their aunts (!). Let an outlaw move and this Domesday Book is thrown open and fingered. . . . No wonder that outlaws have been voluntarily surrendering themselves rather than bear the strain, and that raiding has paid no dividend. . . .”

Whatever may have been the truth of this description, the results, at any rate, were the same in both cases. In Kohat some 250 out of 300 outlaws were disposed of in two years, while in Dera Ismail Khan the number was ninety out of a hundred, and peace returned to the district.

Perhaps the easiest and most interesting way of showing the reader what the results were, and how they were brought about, will be by taking up the case of one specific outlaw and following it to its end, because the main lines of procedure in each such case were, more or less, identical.

THE CAPTURE OF OUTLAW "A."

Call the outlaw "A" (this was not even his initial, but it will serve). "A" had, originally, committed a murder, say, in the village of "K" and had fled across the border.

Investigation into his past history disclosed that:

- (a) All his subsequent raids had been carried out along certain defined routes. Never had he gone to the right hand or to the left. Why? Because he had friends and relations along these routes?
- (b) In the village of "K" were two distinct factions, each led by certain headmen. The victims of each raid committed by this outlaw belonged to one of these factions. In no case had a man of the other faction been touched! Why? Was it because the latter faction was in league with the outlaw and was assisting him?
- (c) What was more, in every village which had been raided by the "gang" there were found to be friends and relations of the said outlaw. (Only in the case of two villages, near the Indus, were we not quite certain for a time whether this was the case. Further inquiry, however, disclosed the fact that in each of these villages was residing one of "A's" *maternal* uncles! Up to then we had rather confined our inquiries to the *paternal* side!)

Were these facts mere coincidences or was it that "A" was not only being helped and assisted by his friends and relations but was also being harboured by one of these factions? Was one faction making use of him against their enemies, the other faction?

Such, indeed, proved to be the case. Now we were ready for the next move. The headmen of both factions were called up and the facts, which were now too strong for them, explained and heavy pressure brought to bear. Seeing how

matters were developing, each became frightened and ready to give the other side away. *Both* factions were frightened because each had their own pet outlaws whom they had been using to further their own ends.

As a result of this pressure the exact whereabouts of "A" were soon ascertained. He was harbouring, say, with the "F" clan of the Mahsuds—with the headman "X." So now pressure was momentarily transferred to the trans-border.

Both the "F" clan and their headman, "X," were in receipt of allowances, conditional on their "good behaviour." Harbou ring outlaws—in contravention of the tribal agreements—especially outlaws guilty of raiding, could hardly be said to come under the definition of "good behaviour"! So pressure was now brought to bear on "X," and it was not long before he began to see reason because it was not long before he came to recognize that "A" could no longer be of any use to him.

As already explained, harbouring outlaws is not done from purely philanthropic motives, only because it pays. "A" no longer dared to raid. His abettors in British territory no longer dared to assist him. But without raiding and obtaining assistance from his friends and relations "A" was no longer of any use to "X." By Pathan custom, "X" was not quite ready to hand him over. But, having no further use for him, he quickly told him to move on elsewhere. But where was "A" to go? No one wanted him. Everywhere he went he received the same reply, "The same pressure is being brought to bear on us. We can't even keep our own outlaws."

When this point had been reached, the death-knell of the outlaw had been sounded. With no place to lay his head he had no alternative but to surrender or to try one more raid—but this time without assistance. Some—very few—did try the latter course, but it invariably led to disaster. So, one by one, they decided to surrender. And that was how the outlaw menace was dealt with. And that was why raiding almost immediately ceased. That this is no exaggeration, surely the figures of that period give incontrovertible proof. Even the few which remained were of little importance and quickly took to "good works"!

But what was possibly of even greater importance was the fact that practically no *new* outlaws came into being. "Outlawry no longer paid!" And it was, I am certain, this fact which kept the border quiet, even after the procedure I have tried to describe had been allowed to fall into abeyance.

It naturally took some time before a sufficient number of *new* outlaws had collected across the border to constitute a menace.

Actually, the outlaw "A" I am thinking of did make another unsuccessful effort, but was captured alive, although his brother-outlaw "G" was killed.

"A's" statement, which I took myself, was most illuminating, as he practically admitted the truth of everything I have given above. But when I asked him, at the end of his statement, "Now, 'A,' tell me what lines you would take as regards 'Frontier policy,'" with a cheeky grin on his face he replied, "How can you expect peace when you reward people for being naughty?" "But," I answered, "surely I haven't been doing this?" "No, you most certainly haven't; otherwise do you think I should be here?"

Whether there was even a substratum of truth or not in what "A" said is immaterial; the fact still remains that the outlaw menace was, for the time being at any rate, done away with and that this success could only have been achieved by information even more complete and up to date than that possessed by the gangs, as only then were we in a position to take the necessary action against their abettors as well as action to enforce the tribal agreements on the subject of outlaws.

Another thing which should be clear from this recital is that it is *in the districts* that the necessary information can be obtained and the necessary knowledge acquired, and that the same applies to the economic dependence of the tribes on the "settled" districts. It is *in the districts* that the knowledge of how the tribes live, move and have their being can be ascertained and also particulars of how and where to exert the necessary economic pressure.

The use of this power and the collection of information, however, necessarily postulate the closest co-operation between the district and the political authorities across the Frontier. Without this, would the Tori Khels have been brought so quickly to their senses in 1902 without a shot being fired? I do not think so. When, therefore, I hear of "raids" occurring as far afield as Paharpur, almost on the Indus, and other places almost equally distant from the border; when I hear of even the Bhittannis—a tribe so utterly dependent on us—raiding, I can only conclude that either the necessary knowledge or the essential co-operation between the districts and the agencies to make use of this knowledge is lacking. Otherwise such things could not possibly occur.

What I have described above is the Sandeman system and those, as I understand them, were his *methods*—"methods," which as Lyautey said, "nobody seems to understand."

And yet they are so simple.

That is how tribal, territorial and village responsibility can be enforced and the headmen *made*, if necessary, to carry out their duties of maintaining law and order.

Some headmen will do their duty because they are decent men and it pays them to do so. No one will work if it doesn't pay! After all, why should he? Others will only work if they are *made* to or they know that their sins will find them out and they will be punished.

That is what is meant by the old Oriental proverb "Awal roti, bad soti" (First bread and then the stick). And that was what Sandeman meant when he said "In one hand I carry a bag of rupees and in the other a stick"—in other words, "Reward the good, and punish the evil."

Let me repeat, the corner-stone of the Frontier administration is the District Officer, working in closest co-operation with the police and Frontier Constabulary inside the districts; and, across the border, with the political authorities. If, however, it is *in the districts* that effective pressure can be brought to bear on the tribes if they misbehave themselves, and it is there also that the necessary knowledge is obtainable, then surely it is self-evident that nothing should be done to weaken the co-operation between the District and Political Officers or to weaken the power of the District Officers *in their relations with the tribes*. Yet that is exactly what has been done. Some of the ways in which that essential co-operation has been undermined I have already described. Others I will show later.

TRIBAL AND VILLAGE ORGANIZATION.

But, before I go on to show what other influences were at work to weaken the co-operation between the districts and the agencies and to weaken the "existing frameworks" (the District Officer and the headmen), it is essential that the reader should have some slight knowledge of the tribal and village organization, as only thus can he understand what their powers consist of and what their limitations.

Across the border each tribe has its tribal, clan, sectional and sub-sectional leaders, while in the district each village has its headman or headmen. Their importance not only varies in accordance with the categories into which they fall, but, also, of course, is largely dependent on the personality of the men themselves. These headmen form the framework of the tribal organization. And, "without them," as Marshal Lyautey said, "nothing can be done." It was, therefore, on them that both the political and district authorities had relied for assistance in the maintenance of law and order, and in keeping the peace of the border. But the amount of assistance the headmen could, or were ready to, give largely depended on the amount of support they in turn could count on from the civil authorities.

But, at this juncture, in order that the reader should get a true perspective of the situation, it is important to remember that, in tribal territory, practically none of the headmen were literate. And the same applied, to a very large extent, to the district headmen. These men—the natural leaders of the people—were only just beginning to wake up to the fact that education might possibly become a necessity for their future success. Up to now they had not seen that education would make them better able to control their tribes or make them more efficient tribal leaders. Intensely conservative in their ideas, they refused to acknowledge this. Their natural prejudices were, in many cases, added to by the fact that the few who had had their sons educated had by no means been very struck with the results. "All that your education has done," said they, "is to make my son look down on his father, and the tribe and his father to look down on my son. You have unfitted him for any other work except a Government appointment, and that you seem either unable or unwilling to give him. What, then, is the use of your much-vaunted education?"

THE POLITICALLY-MINDED-CUM-INTELLIGENTSIA CLASS VERSUS THE HEADMEN.

Be that as it may—one thing at least is certain, and that is that, by degrees, there grew up—possibly in the natural process of evolution—an "official" and "intelligentsia" class whose aspirations were more or less at one, and that, in this class—for the time being, at any rate—few of the natural leaders of the people were represented.

The cleavage between these two classes or parties—the "intelligentsia-cum-official" party on the one side, and the "headmen" on the other—naturally spread, the latter arguing, "Up to now you have always worked through us. Just because a man can read and write it does not necessarily mean that he is a better man or that he can control our tribes better than we can. Yet these are the men you are putting over our heads and deferring to. And what have been the results?" And were the results remarkably good?

On the other side, the politically minded of the official class, to which must be added the "middlemen," as well as the "intelligentsia," were jealous of the tribal leaders. "They looked upon them as reactionaries and against the interests and aspirations of the educated classes." For, as Sir Henry Dobbs pointed out, "Civil officials are mostly educated Orientals, brought up in towns, who have a great dislike and suspicion of the tribes, the tribal organization and the tribal chiefs, and more often than not are out to destroy them by every means in their power." Written of Irak, it was equally true of the Frontier.

That such should be the case is not singular. It is indeed occurring amongst all peoples in the transitional stage. For instance, only the other day I saw it mentioned, of somewhere in Africa, I think, that: "The educated and Westernized class have always viewed with hostility and as a surrender to ignorant tribalism and feudal ideas" any giving in on this point. The same writer pointed out that "the present march of the politically minded has been an attempt to gather the reins more and more into their own hands and gradually to oust the tribal leader from his position of local authority."

"Their wisdom in doing so," he went on to say, "is debatable," but it is also understandable. What, however, is not so understandable is that the Government should have been ready to assist the politically minded in ousting the headmen from their positions when the politically minded had not the power or the influence to take their places. Yet that, I believe, is exactly what has been done.

"Turk, Arab or Persian succeeded or failed according to whether they were with or against the ruling chieftains of the hills," writes Miss Freya Stark in "The Valley of the Assassins."

In India we shall succeed or fail according to whether the military races are with us or not. On the Frontier the same applies with even greater force. We cannot afford to antagonize and thereby drive them, if not into the enemies' camp, then at least into opposition.

My object is not to criticize but to state facts and show what was occurring behind the scenes. And it would be idle to say that either the Reforms (whether necessary in themselves or not, that is not the point) or the policy of weakness, which went with them, did not most adversely affect the Frontier situation, and, by playing into the hands of the politically minded class, weaken still further the power and influence of the headmen and, as a natural corollary, that of the District Officers as well.

For, in place of the "existing frameworks," what else was there to offer—an administration largely based on the politically minded class? This might not have mattered had the latter had either the power or even the will to take the place of those whom they were ousting. Such power as they did have had rested largely on the Government, and to the tribesmen and their leaders it seemed that the Government were themselves gradually and voluntarily relinquishing control.

It matters not, again, whether the headmen were justified or not in their belief. The point is that they had it. When some of the Waziristan headmen said to me, "When the Sarkar gives up control will you come back and lead us when we

march on Delhi?" they may have been speaking in jest, but it probably did, at any rate, indicate how their minds were working.

THE CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITY ON THE FRONTIER.

Such, then, were some of the factors which were slowly but surely weakening "the chain of responsibility" on which the peace of the border was so dependent. But there were many others also which, as a result of "the policy of conciliation," adopted at the time of the "reforms," were working in the same direction—weakening "existing frameworks" and hammering at the foundations.

What were the links in the Waziristan administrative chain? They were the Resident, the District and Political Officers, the police and other civil forces, the tribal leaders and tribal levies—and behind them, only to be used in case of trouble, the Army and the Air Force.

I have already indicated how the power and influence of both the district and tribal headmen may have been weakened by forces beyond their control.

But what of the others? If it be true that "the politics of the hills cannot be separated from the plains" can we truthfully assert that we have not been encouraging such a separation and thereby weakening every link in the chain?

For instance, take the "Resident." "To ensure the closest co-operation between the districts and the agencies (to say nothing of that between the civil and military) and to get them to work together as one team was, I consider, one of the most difficult and onerous tasks of the Resident in Waziristan," for on this depended largely the whole working of the machine.

Yet I am now informed—with what truth I cannot say—that the post of Resident is shortly to be done away with. To say the least of it, is this wise? Can the doing away with the central co-ordinating authority do anything else but weaken still further the chain of responsibility?

Again, let us consider whether we have not gone even further against the axiom that "the politics of the hills are inseparable from the plains" by deliberately encouraging a separation between the districts and the agencies.

Some time ago I noted on this very subject: "I view with great misgiving the separation in the control of the agencies and districts. For such a separation must, eventually, affect co-operation between them as the pre-requisite of the application of the economic pressure on the tribes (the importance of which I have already stressed) is that the district and police

officers should have a complete knowledge of how the tribes live, move and have their being," and that this knowledge should be put at the disposal of the political authorities.

Must not that separation inevitably make it more difficult to obtain that information? And as the requisite knowledge decreases and the cleavage between them spreads—as spread it must—will it not make the maintenance of the peace of the border more difficult? Indeed when I hear of the happenings in Waziristan and in the neighbouring districts I cannot help wondering whether it has not already begun to do so and whether I was not even justified of a further note made in that year when I said that "the weakening of every link in the administrative chain will eventually throw us back on to the evils of the 'Close Border' system—expeditions."

At any rate, whatever the causes, an expedition did become necessary.

THE POLICE.

Now consider the police. There is not a police officer, I am certain, who would not admit that the support and co-operation of the District Officers is absolutely essential, if order is to be maintained properly. Neither is there a District Officer who would not admit how dependent he is on the police for the efficient running of his district. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that "the successful working of any constitution must depend very largely on the efficiency, contentment and impartiality of the police." How far the control of the police has already been handed over to Indian ministers I do not know. But, without in any way throwing any aspersions, I cannot see how it is possible that such a course can help but adversely affect the position, power and influence of the District Officers, the men to whom the masses have always looked for justice. A man cannot serve two masters!

THE FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATIONS.

But whatever conclusions may be come to on these controversial points, there is at least one important innovation affecting the direct administration of the N.W.F.P.—either for good or ill—which must be mentioned, and that has to do with the "Frontier Crimes Regulations."

The Frontier Crimes Regulations were built on the "existing frameworks" of the tribal organization and the tribal customs. These Regulations were made out by officers who had an intimate knowledge of the tribes and knew what they were doing. It was under these Regulations that much of the economic and other pressure I have mentioned was exercisable.

It was, therefore, on these Regulations that a great deal of the peace of the border depended. Yet, despite warnings of what the probable results would be, the F.C.R.—I think I am right in saying—have been done away with. If this is true, and when we hear of raids occurring miles inside the districts which could not possibly have occurred if such action as I have painted had been taken and such pressure brought to bear, then one can only conclude that it must be so.

It may be said that the F.C.R. are still in force in the agencies. But the point is that it is *in the districts* that pressure can be brought to bear on the tribes, and it is *in the districts* that the people assisting “raiders” can be punished, and this is the only way I know of that will definitely put a stop to such Frontier crimes.

Is it wise, then, to have done away with “the means and the machinery” by which this can be achieved? “Tamper not with the civil order where the fires of destruction lie so close beneath the surface” was a wise saying. And certainly on the Frontier the fires lie very “close.”

Ghenghis Khan may have crushed his enemies with great brutality. But the age in which he lived was brutal. But few will deny that he gave peace to his own people, and to such an extent that a virgin could traverse any part of his vast dominions with a bag of gold and none would molest her. This peace he attributed largely to his code of laws, his “Yassa,” which was also built on the tribal customs of his people.

Indeed, not long before his death he spoke in “The Assembly,” saying, “I have gained great mastery by virtue of the ‘Yassa.’ Live ye in obedience to the laws.” Another of his sayings was, “To make a vase thou dost avail thyself of a potter.” I wonder how many “Frontier potters” were in favour of doing away with the F.C.R. or whether it may not have been that “political considerations” were, once again, allowed to outweigh “administrative,” much to the detriment of the peace of the border?

CHAPTER XII.

The Responsibility of the District and Political Officers as well as the Headmen.

It is not my object, nor is it for me to say—even if I could—who is to blame for the present disturbances in Waziristan. Only those who are cognizant of all the facts are in a position to do so and to apportion the blame.

But when we blame the headmen (as we have been doing) for their inability to control their tribesmen—and probably they are to blame—we are, at any rate, by implication, blaming the civil authorities—the Political Officers across the border, and the district authorities inside the districts. The Political Officers because they were unable to control the tribes and, if necessary, to compel the tribal headmen to carry out their primary duty of keeping order. The district authorities because, as it was in the districts that economic and other pressure could be brought to bear on the tribes, they either did not, or could not, exert the necessary pressure.

It is, however, always easy to cast aspersions. And that is not my intention. Neither is it my wish to make destructive criticisms. But my hope is that a plain statement of facts may assist those desirous of coming to a clear understanding of what were the possible, if not probable, causes of our present troubles, as well as help those whose duty it is to put forward a policy which will make these tribesmen our friends. For nothing else can be of any use.

Blame the headmen and, by implication, the district and political authorities. But when you do so, in fairness to them realize the colossal difficulties and handicaps which, largely through no fault of theirs, they have been working under.

Indeed, I am convinced that “such matters as I have described might have been of much less importance had the situation on other parts of the Frontier and in other parts of India been satisfactory.” But it was not.

Grievances the Waziristan tribes may have had, but there is no getting away from the fact that they had also received certain benefits. And had Waziristan, like Baluchistan, formed a separate entity (I am not arguing that it should have), it is just possible that, despite the mistakes made, it might have weathered the storm and there might have been no “rising.”

But the tragedy of the present Waziristan “rising” is that the trouble very largely emanated from “outside.”

As far back as 1932 I wrote, in commenting on the debacle in Peshawar of 1931: "If the present trouble spreads to Waziristan it will in no way be due to the system but to our failure to recognize with Lord Roberts that 'It would be foolish to forget that these tribes are not our own flesh and blood and their loyalty is the outcome of their belief in our invincibility and of their reliance on our power to defend them.'"

It was, fortunately, many years later when the trouble did really spread to Waziristan, but who will say that, when it did, it was not due to the tribesmen's belief in our invincibility having been shaken?

Sandeman's warning was couched in much the same terms when he said, "If we knit the Frontier tribes into our Imperial system in time of peace and make their interests our own, they will certainly not oppose us in time of war and, as long as we are ready to hold our own, we can certainly depend on them being on our side."

Yet once again they have "opposed" us, not in time of war but in time of peace. Were Lord Roberts and Sandeman, then, wrong? Or is the reason for their having done so due to the fact that we have, in the meanwhile, been shaking "their belief in our invincibility" and making them very doubtful whether we are "ready to hold our own"? Is it also due to the fact that we have failed to convince them that we do look upon "their interests as our own" or that they can "rely on our power to defend them"?

That is the question and that, I believe, is the answer. Far more than any of the reasons I have given, far more than any of the mistakes we may have made in Waziristan, what was really the root cause of the trouble was that the happenings in other parts of India and on other parts of the Frontier had first of all weakened and then almost shattered the tribesmen's belief not only in our power but also in our beneficence. And "make an Oriental believe that you are afraid of him and he is formidable indeed."

In former times, India's troubles had usually come from the Frontier and its Frontier troubles from across the border. But since the past twenty years a far more dangerous situation has arisen and one far more difficult to cope with. And that is that our Frontier troubles have largely been the outcome of "unrest" in India proper and the policy adopted by the authorities towards it. And so from India the poison spread to the Frontier. It first infected its nerve-centre, Peshawar, and from there its malignant growth ate its way into the districts and then on into the Frontier tribes across the border.

While, therefore, it may not be my province to criticize

what had been going on in other parts of India or to say whether the measures taken there had been good or bad, it is absolutely essential to a correct understanding of the Frontier problem that the result of these happenings, first, on the Frontier at large, and then on Waziristan in particular, should be traced.

Indeed, if we are searching for a solution of the Frontier problem; if we are seeking for some way to make these tribesmen our friends, then to ignore these things which were almost certainly the root causes of our present troubles, would be like a doctor, who, seeking for a remedy for his patient, prescribed for certain outward abrasions when what the latter was really suffering from was internal cancer. Any permanent remedy must do away with the cause. It must cut out the growth.

To a certain extent, at any rate, the Government's admission that one of the main underlying causes of the Waziristan disturbances—in addition to the tribesmen's hopes of loot and securing rifles—was "their belief that the constitutional changes in India indicated weakness on the part of the Government" goes some way to bear out this contention.

To eradicate such a belief, even if it were an unjustified one, would be absolutely essential to the success of any future Frontier policy.

How much more so must this be the case in the present instance, when—who can deny it?—the tribesmen have every reason and every excuse for holding such opinions?

What effect the policy of reforms and the policy of extreme conciliation, which went with it, had on the rest of India has been dealt with by many far abler writers than myself.

Those, however, who wish to see what the results on India and indeed on other parts of the Frontier were, cannot do better than read those two very able books: "The India we Saw," by Major Cadogan; and "Imperial Policing," by Sir C. Gwynn.

In so far, then, as my object is concerned, it will suffice here to point out very briefly some of the results mentioned by them which had disastrous effects not only on the Frontier districts but also on the tribes across our borders.

From "The India We Saw" the reader would see how "the notion that it is not so much co-operation as coercion that exacts concessions" had obtained so firm a hold on the country at large; how "the prospect of 'self-government' added a stimulant to the rivalries of the two communities" (Hindus and Mohammedans); also how "the misdirected efforts to placate" the extremists led to demonstrations in many parts of India, and how the weakness shown in dealing with the various subversive movements had disastrous consequences.

I have myself shown how the "prospect of self-government" or, at any rate, of getting added power and influence, had "stimulated the rivalries of the two communities" on the Frontier—the headmen on the one side and the politically-minded-cum-intelligentsia on the other. Also how the policy then adopted did, either wittingly or unwittingly, play into the hands of the latter.

From "Imperial Policing" the reader will see how "civil officials, influenced by a desire to carry out loyally the policy of extreme conciliation imposed on them" by the authorities, were constrained to pander to agitation; how "the impression that an officer taking action might be sacrificed to political pressure" gained ground and naturally led to further weaknesses; how even the Government of India, "having recently had to face controversy and political propaganda" (over the Amritsar affair), "were unwilling to take responsibility" (of proclaiming martial law when it was absolutely necessary to save bloodshed) because they feared "a political outcry"; and how, last but not least, the weakness shown by the Government in dealing with these disruptive elements led, first, to the debacle in Peshawar in 1931, and then to the far more "formidable development" that "the unrest spread to the tribes."

To a people, like the Pathan tribes, always prone "to despise you for your weakness rather than admire you for your benevolence," and of whom it has truly been said that "anything which can be interpreted as weakness encourages those who are sitting on the fence" were there not a thousand and one things which they could only interpret as "weakness"?

If so, then had they no excuse for their loss of belief and loss of faith in us?—for, of all the inveterate "sitters on the fence" the Pathan tribesmen are about the worst. They are always on the look-out for any signs of weakness on the part of the authorities and "let the central authority, for whatever cause, become weak or be believed to be weak" (the belief is quite sufficient, for the Pathan will be good if it pays him to be so, certainly not otherwise), "and 'the fringe' celebrates it in an orgy of self-will," wrote Bertram Thomas about the Arabs. And it is equally true of the Pathan.

"A fish rots at the head" is an Oriental proverb, and had the Pathan no reason, or excuse at least, for believing that the central authority was weak?

"The strength of a wall is neither greater nor less than the courage of those who defend it." Undermine and weaken the dam and there is great danger that, like their own mountain streams, dry and silent for the most part, save when storms crashing on the hills, bring them down in wild spate, the tribal storm will burst and the torrents sweep down with irresistible

force on to the plains of India. For the Frontier tribes are sitting on the fence waiting and watching; watching for any signs of weakness on the part of the authorities." These are words of warning I uttered some years ago. And it would surely be idle to deny that in the past few years the tribes have seen a spectacle of weakness which they had never seen before.

The rich lands which lie at the foot of the Frontier hills in the Dera Ismail Khan district are almost entirely dependent for their harvest on rain and the flood-waters which come down from the mountains of Waziristan. But let these torrents not be controlled and they sweep everything before them, leaving behind them a desert. The same applies to the tribes of that country, and the only safeguard against them is the reality of British control.

Can the Government, then, be entirely exonerated from blame that, seeing, as they believed, the ramparts crumbling and "the dam" weakening, and the Government, as they thought, surrendering control to the forces of disruption, the tribesmen made the attempt once more to test the ramparts and to see whether the dam would still hold?

If these facts be true, it would be madness not to recognize them and their significance. Otherwise, whatever the remedy we put forward, whatever the Frontier policy we adopt, it can only be a palliative. For remember "the dam" which stopped the tribal torrent was British or, at any rate, made by British officers and engineers. The peace of the border is dependent—as was testified to by the Hindus of Dera Ismail Khan—on the reality of British control. India cannot and never has been able to hold her frontiers without assistance. To deny this fact would be futile; to ignore it must surely end in disaster.

Whatever our future policy, therefore, may be, it must definitely prove to the tribes that the idea that that control is slipping out of our grasp is wrong.

Not so long ago Sir Philip Chetwode remarked, "If we go to war, we wish to go with India behind us." How much more so is this the case with the Frontier tribes, more especially if there is any truth in the even more trenchant remark, "The side which has the Frontier with it will win." And we shall never have them with us unless we can make them our friends. And we shall never make them our friends unless they respect us. And they will never respect us unless they are convinced of our power and will to govern.

PRESTIGE.

If it be true, as Lord Curzon said, that "it is on British prestige that our Empire in the East rests," then what had we done since the Great War to uphold that essential "prestige"?

What, for example, had the Frontier tribes seen and what had the Wazirs and Mahsuds looked down upon from their mountain-tops?

During the Great War the tribes along the border had been inundated with propaganda to the effect that “owing to the great losses we had incurred, and the great effort we had put up, the British were weak and ready to retire from the Frontier.” That, as Sir C. Gwynn points out, was “the basic cause” of all our troubles in India, namely, “the belief in the imminent downfall of British rule.” And it most certainly was the basic cause of all our troubles on the Frontier.

Despite this and largely as a result of the Amir Habibullah’s loyalty to his engagements with us—although there was spasmodic trouble both in Waziristan and elsewhere—the Frontier, with a certain amount of difficulty, was able to weather the storm.

Then followed the unfortunate murder of Habibullah and the Third Afghan War. Waziristan, still restless and untamed, was sitting on the fence waiting and watching for any signs of weakness, when suddenly, out of the blue, came the order for the retirement of the Waziristan Militias—a retirement which many officers considered to have been unnecessary.

Be that as it may, the disastrous results on the Frontier situation were only too apparent.

“To sit idle,” once said Sir Alfred Lyall, on another critical occasion, “is ruinous and will lose us the tribes and lose us our reputation.”

During the war—possibly for the adequate reason that we had more pressing calls elsewhere—although not idle, we had at least adopted or been forced to adopt a more or less defensive policy on the Frontier.

Now that the war was over, especially in view of the whisperings of evil and self-interested persons that we were weak—whisperings which, we must have known, had shaken the tribesmen’s belief in our invincibility—was the time to have shown strength in order to avoid having to use it.

When, however, instead of this came an order for the retirement of the Militias, was it any wonder if the tribesmen took it as a complete confirmation of these reports, or that it drove them to rise? Money and arms—the lodestar of the Pathan—were his for the taking! With a Pathan’s mental outlook what else could he think but that this retirement presaged the long-talked-of “downfall of the British Raj”? He would be a fool not to take his opportunity. What wonder if he went “over the top”?

After the Afghan War followed the Waziristan expedition of

1919-23, with its great expenditure to the Government, both in lives and money, as well as the very heavy loss to the tribesmen themselves.

This forced the Government to review the whole question of Waziristan and, as a result, after much fear and trepidation on their part, there was evolved the policy which, whatever its faults may have been, did, at any rate, bring to that country and to the neighbouring districts the longest period of peace and security which they had ever enjoyed.

What the results of this policy and of the adoption of these methods were on Waziristan and the neighbouring districts I have already briefly shown.

But if my reader is to understand fully what were the reasons for this as well as the causes of the steady deterioration which subsequently took place in the Frontier situation, first on other parts of the Frontier and then, slowly but surely, spread to Waziristan, it will be necessary at this juncture to give him a very brief résumé of the past and a description of the ebb and flow of the tide.

Again and again had the history of the Frontier shown how right was Lyautey when he said that "without the headmen nothing could be done," and how equally wise he was in saying that a policy not based on "existing frameworks" inevitably leads to chaos.

For example, whatever may have been the rights or wrongs of Napier's actual conquest of Sind, there can be no doubt that his subsequent administration did bring peace and prosperity to that country. Nor can it be disputed that his administration was based on these same fundamental principles. "I know," he said, "that the nobles can never be good or contented subjects unless we give them employment and honour them," and the tranquillity which followed he put down "not to force of arms but to the justice and kindness of the Government towards all ranks. They were quiet," he said, "because they knew their own interests."

The same applied, in possibly even greater measure, to General John Jacob, who "diverted the acquisitiveness of the tribes from predatory into peaceful channels," and laid special stress on "moral rather than physical force," pointing out that, "having by the use of force made ourselves feared and respected, we were able to apply better means and appeal to higher motives than fear."

And the reasons for the deterioration in Sind after Jacob's death were, as I have already pointed out, attributed by Bartle Frere to our having "forsaken the old system."

It must also be remembered that Lawrence attributed the staunchness of the Punjab during the Mutiny to the fact that

he and his officers "had studied to make themselves acquainted with the usages, the feelings and the wants of every class and race and endeavoured to improve the conditions of all."

That these were the fundamental principles of Sandeman's administration of Baluchistan and the methods adopted by him I have already shown. But it is well to remember that Sandeman himself claimed no originality for his system. What he did claim was that he was the only true disciple of Edwardes, Nicholson and others of their school.

Past experience on the Frontier had taught me again and again that even under the handicaps of the "Close Border" system the application of Sandeman's principles of rebuilding on "existing frameworks" and resuscitating the power and influence of the headmen was not only feasible but invariably led to success. It had also taught me that without the assistance of the headmen "nothing could be done." It had also demonstrated that their assistance, combined with the methods of enforcing tribal, territorial and village responsibility, enumerated above, always produced the same results—an immediate and remarkable decrease in serious crime in the districts, and an almost complete cessation in raiding from across the border.

If anyone wishes to verify this, he can easily do so by looking up the Annual Reports of the Bannu District from 1902 to 1904; the Hazara District from 1904 to 1906; the Charsadda Sub-Division from 1906 to 1908, and again from 1909 to 1911. But more especially will he find it in the reports of the Kohat District from 1921 to 1923, when, as described, outlaws were practically wiped out, while murders, to take one example of district crime, dropped from 101 in 1920 to 47 in 1921. I specially draw attention to Kohat because the Judicial Commissioner, when commenting very favourably on the remarkable decrease in crime, drew special attention to the fact that these results were due, not so much to judicial tribunals as to "executive measures"—that is to say, to the measures, methods and principles I have already described.

What the results on the outlaw problem were in Dera Ismail Khan I have shown, but as to the general results I will merely add that the Foreign Secretary in India himself testified that, "whereas in 1919 the number of persons killed, kidnapped and wounded had been 125, 62 and 61 respectively in the years 1926-27, not a single person had been killed or kidnapped and only one person wounded," and, "above all, as the Border Administration Report attested," peace reigned in Waziristan.

These, in every case, were, if my diagnosis is correct, the results of rebuilding the administration on the old foundations. And it was these results which called forth the remark from the Hindus of Dera Ismail Khan which I have already quoted.

These satisfactory results led, as they always will do, to a very distinct rise in the Government's "prestige," and did a great deal towards reviving the tribesmen's belief in our power and will to govern—a belief which, in Waziristan, had almost received its death-blow when the Militias retired.

While, however, our "prestige" had been steadily rising in Waziristan, the same was by no means the case on other parts of the Frontier.

There once again followed concessions, the evil effects of which were soon apparent in Peshawar and, spreading rapidly outwards, led to communal riots in Kohat and communal disturbances in Dera Ismail Khan and other districts.

So disastrous, indeed, were the results of this "policy of extreme conciliation," described by Sir C. Gwynn, that even Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan, the very districts which had shown such satisfactory results only a few years before, had to admit to a rise in serious crime of 123 per cent.

(What was the cause of this deterioration? Was it in no way due to the perverse propaganda from inside India? Had the headmen, again, no cause to say that they were not being adequately supported? Were these not among the main reasons?)

Even still more pernicious were the results on Peshawar itself where "the failure of authority to enforce law and order led to such a contempt of authority that murders alone," as *The Times* said, "rose to one a day and the collection of revenue almost entirely ceased."

On the top of this came the debacle in Peshawar of 1931, the immediate causes of which have been fully described in Sir Charles Gwynn's "Imperial Policing," as well as by an eye-witness. They may be summed up as being due to "a negligence on the part of the authorities to appreciate the real nature of the Red Shirt and City Movements," while to this same neglect can be attributed the subsequent Afridi invasion of Peshawar and the Mohmand troubles which followed.

That these were certainly the direct and immediate causes no one with any knowledge of the Frontier would deny. But it would be idle to pretend that they were not also the results of a policy which, for some time past, had been playing into the hands of the politically minded class, who had neither the power nor the influence to take the place of the natural tribal leaders whom we, intentionally or not, had been assisting them to oust.

That this was so—in so far as the Red Shirts, at least, were concerned—is, I think, clearly proved from the fact that, although *The Times* reported that "the Red Shirts have established themselves so firmly that over large areas the King's

writ does not run," so little firm did their seat prove to be that, at the very first show of strength on the part of the authorities, the movement more or less collapsed. And the same "eye-witness" was able to testify that "within a week the whole atmosphere of the Peshawar district had changed, within a fortnight conditions had reverted, at least superficially, to those that had prevailed before the organization of the Rural movement."

Thus, once again, it was proved how right was John Lawrence when he wrote at the time of the Mutiny, "When have we ever failed when we acted vigorously? When have we succeeded when guided by timorous councils?" For, if there is one lesson which stands out above all others during this period in the history of the Frontier—in the history of India—it is that never once did we fail when we acted vigorously and never once did we succeed when guided by timorous counsels. Yet, can anyone argue that, especially with a race like the Pathans, who reverence force above all things, the happenings I have depicted or am about to depict, showed that we had learnt that lesson? I think not. For instance, what of the tribes of Waziristan? What must have been their thoughts as they saw the poison from India spreading ever nearer?

For it is only by looking at the chain of events as they developed from the tribesmen's point of view that we can hope to bring the picture into its right perspective. It is only by appreciating the impressions and reactions which these happenings were bound to have on a people with the mentality of these wild tribesmen that we can hope to see what were the real causes of their defection and the reasons for the state of lawlessness and contempt of authority which were so soon to be made manifest.

They had seen the retirement of the Militias which, coming on top of the false propaganda, so assiduously dinned into their ears, had caused them to rise in open rebellion in 1919.

They had seen the Afghan War and how Nadir's attack on Thal had entirely dislocated the plans of the General Staff.

Whether they actually believed that the war had been a victory for Afghan arms, as the Afghans asserted, is immaterial. At any rate, they had certainly not been unduly impressed by the defensive attitude we had adopted nor by the terms of the treaty signed with Afghanistan. Indeed, it would not be surprising if they considered "the very leniency of the terms indicated that possibly peace had been purchased."

They had either seen for themselves or had heard of the various happenings in India, and, still nearer home, in Peshawar. And they must have asked themselves whether these "did not denote weakness on the part of the Government.

They had watched the "Khilafat" movement and the steady rise to power of the Red Shirts, and, watching, must have wondered what such things signified. They knew that, under a policy such as Sandeman's, such disruptive movements as the Red Shirts could not have come into being as, had they done so, it would have meant a complete break-up of the whole system and an abrogation of the power and influence of the natural tribal leaders—the headmen.

They knew all there was to be known about the Afridi and Mohmand troubles; that a road had been started into the Afridi country and that, at the very first sign of trouble, work on the road had been discontinued. What wonder if some of their wilder characters took this to heart and said to themselves, "If we don't want roads all we have to do is to give trouble."

Not very much impressed with the terms of the Afghan Treaty, was it very likely that they were more so by the terms given to the Mohmands—especially in view of the very strong wording of the initial proclamation sent to them before the troops entered the country? Words which the final settlement hardly fulfilled.

Some of the possible causes of the Mohmand troubles and the lessons to be learnt from them and from the expedition sent into their country were dealt with by me in the January and February numbers of the *Indian Empire Review* of 1936. In these articles I pointed out that we should certainly not evolve any policy likely to succeed for the future if we looked upon the Mohmand affair as merely "one of the periodical Frontier troubles of the old days and ignored what were the main causes."

It is no use beating about the bush and trying to ignore the fact that if "our hold on India depends on prestige" any future policy which is not based on a recognition of that elementary principle must fail. The basic cause of all our troubles in India is "the belief in the impending downfall of British rule," and the first essential of any future policy, at any rate in dealing with Pathans, is to eradicate that belief.

"Our policy," said John Lawrence at the time of the Mutiny, "is to act at once, to recall the disloyal to a sense of duty, to assure the wavering and to strike at revolt."

"Every Englishman should read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the history of the Mutiny. It is as full of lessons as an egg is full of meat," said Lord Cromer—or words to that effect.

But instead of taking these lessons to heart and the lessons of the Frontier, which are the same, is it too much to say that everywhere the Waziristan tribesmen looked they had seen weakness and vacillation—or, rather, they had seen inaction taking the place of action?

From 1919 to 1922 they had learnt to their cost that the Government could still strike. They had seen the peace which they themselves had been so instrumental in breaking return once more to the neighbouring districts. They had seen a new policy inaugurated in their own country from which they had hoped great things.

That was one side of the picture, but by degrees they began to see quite another. Always on the watch for any signs of weakness, they began to see a gradual reversion from the policy of rebuilding on the old existing foundations to one of concession and weakness. And it was not long before they were to see, once more, lawlessness and crime the invariable concomitants of such a policy, spreading into all the neighbouring districts and the poison drawing ever nearer to their own country.

For up till then, despite all the perverse movements I have described, Waziristan, as a result, I can only think, of some good in the policy I have been speaking of, remained firm (from 1923 to 1933). And, to such an extent was this the case that, during the troubles in Peshawar, the authorities were able, as I have already mentioned, to send "Frontier Constabulary" and "Scouts" from "the Waziristan district" to assist in quelling the disturbances.

But how long, in face of the happenings I have painted, could this be expected to last? The wonder, to my mind, is not, therefore, that they broke out into revolt but that they did not do so earlier.

Try to put yourself in the place of the tribesmen—the tribesmen with their mentality and outlook—and think what they must have thought when they heard of the further concessions being made to the politically minded. What the Red Shirt leader had preached was well known to them—"to drive the English out of India." Think, then, what must be their amazement now when they hear of the Red Shirt leader's brother being called on to assist in forming a Ministry. I am not arguing whether this is right or wrong. All I am saying is, "How can the tribesmen possibly be expected to understand?"

Only the other day I was reading a comment on Marshal Lyautey's wonderful work in Morocco, but how grave was now the danger that this might all be undone "because the French Government, in a fit of misplaced democratic enthusiasm, had introduced an elective element into the administration so that political considerations have been added to the country's (Morocco's) troubles."

We have done the same on the Frontier, and may it not be

that we shall find that, by allowing "political considerations" to outweigh "administrative," we have let "expediency" take the place of "justice"?

Be that as it may, let us at least be candid with ourselves and not lay the blame entirely on the headmen and local officers, but recognize that the present Indian policy—whether right or wrong—has had the effect not only of undermining their power and influence, but has also gone diametrically against many of the elementary principles by which most of our great Frontier administrators were governed.

I have seen it argued that, even if this were true, "the menace of the Frontier cannot be allowed to invalidate solemn pledges."

But what are these "solemn pledges" which are referred to? The most solemn pledge, both given and implied, which I know of is "to keep the peace of the border" and "to do justice to rich and poor alike"; and our most solemn duty, "to save India from invasion." These surely are pledges which in India's interests, let alone in our own, we dare not break. And it is on how we fulfil this pledge that we shall be judged.

"The question," said the Frenchman M. Paul Bovell, "is not whether England has the right to keep India but rather whether she has the right to leave it."

Now that we are considering the Frontier problem afresh, let us remember that "before the British came no invasion ever failed; whereas, after their coming, none has ever succeeded." And if, as I believe, the only safeguard on the Frontier is the reality of British control, let us be very careful before we surrender any control which is essential, lest by doing so we risk opening up again the flood-gates of invasion and letting loose the tribes on to the plains of India. For, in John Lawrence's words, we must "remember the loss of legitimate influence really means the loss of peace, the loss of security, the loss of freedom and the loss of all that renders possible the existence of the Indian Empire."

To ensure this we must evolve a policy which has as its aim and object the making of these tribesmen into our friends. Nothing else can be of any permanent use. Such a policy was Sandeman's and such, I believe, was the policy we were starting to inaugurate in Waziristan and one which I am convinced would have succeeded had it been carried to its logical conclusion, instead of going back on it and adopting a policy of compromise.

But are there any signs that we have recognized even this initial truth or seen exactly what the real problem is? I can see none. Surely the problem on the Frontier is the same as

that so aptly described by Lord Cromer, when he said, "We are in truth always striving to attain two ideals, which are apt to be mutually destructive—the ideal of good government, which connotes the continuance of our supremacy, and the ideal of self-government, which connotes the whole or partial abdication of our supreme position."

Faced with this alternative, Lord Cromer, while never unmindful of the legitimate aspirations of the politically minded, refused to allow the welfare of the people committed to his charge to be subordinated to political considerations, and, as we know, assured of the trust and affection of the *fellaheen*, he deservedly triumphed.

On the Frontier the two mutually destructive ideals are those of the two mutually antagonistic parties—the District Officer and the headman, on the one side, and the politically-minded-cum-intelligentsia on the other. And how did we deal with this problem on the Frontier?

We pretended to recognize that the success of the administration was largely dependent on the corner-stones of the District Officer and the headmen, and that these, in turn, were dependent on the support they could count on from the authorities. Yet, by pandering to the aspirations and ambitions of the politically minded, who very naturally were out by every means in their power to break the influence of the headmen, we actually—whatever we may say to the contrary—did assist them in doing so.

Then, faced with failure, we put forward the "old threadbare excuse which has served to cover most of our failures on the Frontier that the headmen had no power," ignoring the fact that, if this was true, we ourselves were probably very largely to blame.

We had tried to serve God and Mammon, and in doing so had "partially," at any rate, "abdicated our supreme position" in favour of the politically minded, shutting our eyes to the fact that they had not, in themselves, either the power or the will to take the place of those whom they were ousting.

We had thereby ignored the solemn warning given by Cromer of what the results of such a course would probably be, when he said:

"It will be well for England, better for India and best of all for the cause of progressive civilization in general, if it be clearly understood from the outset that, however liberal may be the concessions which have now been made, we have not the slightest intention of abandoning our Indian possessions.

... It may be that at some future and far-distant time we shall be justified in handing over the torch of progress and civilization in India to those whom we have ourselves civilized. All

that can be said at present is that, until human nature entirely changes, and until racial and religious passions disappear from the face of the earth, the relinquishment of that torch would almost certainly result in its extinguishment."

Another critic wrote:

"One weak point in all the discussions of the North-West Frontier was that few considered the welfare of the tribes . . . the honourable exceptions were the Sandeman school who have always said that the tribes have rights and are, in themselves, a human problem."

These words were written many years ago, but do they not give a solution to the problem? Both Cromer and Sandeman looked on it as "a human problem"—that is to say, from the point of view of the welfare of the people—and therefore allowed no considerations, political or otherwise, to stand in the way of the fulfilment of their charge.

We on the Frontier have closed our eyes to this aspect of the case. And it is because we have refused to face the reality of the problem that it has been rendered so difficult.

But hiding our eyes to this fact can do no good. The problem still remains. It is whether we are to back the politically minded or the masses; whether to base our policy on "existing frameworks," by once again resuscitating the power and influence of the headmen, or to continue to play into the hands of their enemies—the politically minded. We cannot do both.

And between these two alternatives, if the security and peace of the border are to be maintained, there should be no difficulty in choosing. The choice must be the same as Cromer's because the politically minded cannot, for many years to come, take the place of the headmen, and "without the headmen nothing can be done."

That is the lesson in so far as the N.W.F.P. as a whole is concerned, while the lesson of the trans-Frontier tribes is, I think, equally clear.

The lesson in so far as the trans-Frontier tribes are concerned—be they Wazirs, Mahsuds, Afridis, Mohmands or what you will—is a simple one. There is nothing new in it. It is as old as the hills which gave it birth. It is the lesson of Peshawar during the Mutiny, when the strong action taken by the civil and military authorities in disarming the disloyal regiments—described by Sir John Lawrence as "a master stroke"—caused the tribesmen to flock to our aid.

The effect of this vigorous and bold action was described by Herbert Edwards as "Instantaneous! Of the 2,000 horse called for some days previously, only one hundred had yet responded, but now the case was altered. As we rode back to cantonments (after the disarmament) friends were as thick as

summer flies and levies began, from that moment, to come in. And before long, even from beyond our borders, Afridis, Mohmands and Yusafzais, who had spent their lives in robbing and killing our subjects, came flocking in." And so will it ever be with the Pathan. He loves the winning side!

That is the old, old lesson of the Frontier. It is the same lesson of the past twenty years that, wherever we have acted with vigour, we have always succeeded, but whenever swayed by timorous counsels we have failed. It is also the answer to Sir Robert Warburton's question, " How many of the Frontier tribes would come to our aid (as they did in the Mutiny) under the present policy? " And the answer is, " Under a policy of weakness and vacillation, probably none," for the Pathan has a fondness only for those whom he respects; respects only those whom he fears; and fears only those who are ready and willing to govern.

In short, in Sir Robert Sandeman's words, " We can count on his being on our side, provided we are ready to hold our own," but not otherwise.

CHAPTER XIII.

Future Policy.

IN conclusion, let me sum up.

The lessons of history, the lessons of the Mutiny, which Cromer advised all Englishmen to read—lessons which are so entirely applicable to the Frontier—seem to indicate that:—

(1) The *supreme test* of any policy, if it is to be successful, must still be the welfare of the people—the welfare of the tribes—because any policy which has subordinated their welfare to purely political considerations has always failed.

(2) The *essentials* of such a policy are:—

(i) It must be built on the “existing frameworks” of the tribal organization and tribal customs. It must be worked through the headmen, because, at present, and for many years to come, there is no efficient substitute. And “without the headmen nothing can be done.”

(ii) The corner-stone of the administration is the District Officer. The corner-stone of the tribal organization is the headman. Any policy which weakens their power weakens the very foundations of law and order, and causes lawlessness. And lawlessness means suffering to the law-abiding masses. It, therefore, fails to stand the supreme test—the welfare of the people.

(iii) The welfare of the people, on the Frontier at any rate, dependent on British control, that control dependent on the closest co-operation between the district and political authorities, the police and the civil authorities—and, as a last resort, on the Army and Air Force—nothing must be done to weaken further that co-operation. Indeed, every effort must be made to strengthen it because inadequate co-operation has already led to, and will inevitably lead to, an increase in crime and further suffering to the people. In addition, on the Frontier there is the added and even greater danger of tribal disturbances and tribal unrest.

(iv) It must be a strong policy because a weak policy, especially in dealing with tribesmen, is in itself provocative and, in the end, inevitably leads to even far greater repressive measures. It is also far more expensive.

(v) As the tribesmen are, for the most part, poor, taxation

must be light and the administration cheap. It must, therefore, be highly efficient, for inefficiency spells corruption; and corruption spells injustice; and injustice spells intense suffering to the people.

(vi) In short, the administration must follow the road taken by all our great Frontier and Colonial administrators, "who, while maintaining law and order and the prestige of Government, were fearless for right, lovers of justice and upholders of those traditions so dear to the tribesmen's hearts and, in a literal sense, 'protectors of the poor.' "

Such are the main *essentials* and the main *principles* of any policy which will fulfil the *supreme test* of the welfare of the people.

On page 183 of Bosworth Smith's "Life of Lord Lawrence," it is pointed out that, though some of his views may now be out of date still "the essential principles will be as true a hundred years hence as they are to-day; and from these principles, as from a mine of wealth, many generations may gather treasures new and old, learning alike what is the practical ideal at which Indian rulers ought to aim, and what are the dangers which it most behoves them to avoid."

It may be said that these are all elementary principles and do not require any stressing. But can we say that half our troubles on the Frontier have not been due to a persistent disregard of these elementary principles; or that, in striving after two mutually destructive ideals, we have not run our heads into dangers which might have been avoided had we followed "practical" and not "impractical" ideals?

So much for policy as a whole.

But in dealing with our future policy, *vis-à-vis* the trans-Frontier tribes in particular, there are certain general but all-important principles which we simply cannot afford to forget, as on them depends entirely the success or failure of any policy. They are that:

(i) The loyalty, or rather the good behaviour, of the tribes is entirely dependent on "their belief in our invincibility and in our power and will to defend them." Shatter that belief—or even weaken it, as we have been doing—and if the history of the Frontier and the history of recent events teaches us anything it is that we do so at a great cost.

The same applies equally to the police. "Their loyalty has been due to their complete trust in the impartiality of their British officers." The confidence of the people in the police has been due to the same causes. Their only real safeguard—as it is the only real safeguard I know of for the peace of the border—has been the reality of British control. And it is this that has been the cause of their confidence.

Can we truthfully deny that their confidence has been shaken or that it must be upheld? For should it go farther, may it not be that, their morale shaken, their confidence gone and the confidence of the people in the force on which their welfare so greatly depends, the doors of lawlessness and chaos will be opened wide? "It is the poor who require protection. Safeguard them and the kingdom is secure."

(ii) In other words, the two foundation-stones on which you must *start* before building any Frontier policy whatever are (a) "prestige" and (b) the tribesmen's "belief" and faith in us. And the second is really included in the first, for, shatter the tribesmen's "belief," and you lose the first. And if you lose the first no policy can possibly be successful.

In this connection, surely, it is significant that, in whatever district a policy of weakness and indecision was shown; and, wherever a policy of pandering to the politically minded was adopted, it immediately led to lawlessness, both inside and across the border, and, as an inevitable consequence, to suffering on the part of the people. While, in those districts where the policy was built, or rebuilt, on the old foundations (of the power and influence of the headmen), it succeeded, and there was peace. But, even in these districts no sooner was there a reversion to a policy of subordinating the welfare of the masses to political considerations than crime again went up in leaps and bounds.

If any reader wishes to verify and check this assertion he has only to look into the history and statistics of crime in the Frontier districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, as well as of the neighbouring Frontier tribes during the past fifteen to twenty years, and even the most sceptical could hardly fail, I think, to be convinced.

In the January and February numbers of the *Indian Empire Review* of 1936, I put forward certain reasons which I believed to have been at the bottom of the Mohmand troubles. I pointed out that we should never evolve a successful policy "if we looked upon . . . the Mohmand affair as merely one of the periodical expeditions of the old days, and ignored what were the main causes."

But, if I was correct in my diagnosis, and if the main causes of our present troubles in Waziristan are—as I believe they are—largely due to the same causes, then it would certainly seem that we either did not sift the Mohmand troubles to their source, or, if we did, we made no real attempt to eradicate the causes. Yet, had we done so, might we not possibly have saved ourselves the expense in lives and money of the present operations?

CHAPTER XIV.

The End and Object of our Policy.

“The world is very old; we must profit by its experience. It teaches that old practices are often worth more than new theories.”

“THOU art Peter and on this rock I will build My Church,” said Christ. Basing our policy on the same rock of justice and the belief of the tribesmen therein, what must be the end and object of our policy? Surely it is clear. “To work for the ‘betterment’ of the tribes and to bring the blessings of civilization within their reach.” Yet is there anything to show that this is the specific end we have in view?

Certainly, speaking the other day, the Viceroy expressed a hope that “the foundations of greater stability had been laid.”

It may be so. But is that the best we can hope for?

And what are the foundations on which these hopes are based?

We are not told. There is nothing to show that these hopes are based on the fact that, at last, we have recognized that the foundation of any successful Frontier policy is that it should fulfil the supreme test of the welfare of the people.

And without this recognition, what guarantee, for instance, have we that there is any finality in our settlement with the Mohmands? What hope is there that there will be anything final about our settlement with the Wazirs and the Mahsuds?

Are the Mohmands and Afridis, the Mahsuds and Wazirs really our friends? Could we count on them in the day of trouble? Is there even any indication that our policy is either aimed at or will really achieve this result? Yet it cannot be stressed too often that that (making the tribesmen our friends) is the only result which can be of any permanent value.

I saw the hatred and bitterness of the Mahsuds after the 1919 expedition; their women our worst enemies. I saw that attitude entirely alter and the women become our best protagonists. Why? Because they saw that we were trying to help them to help themselves; trying, in fact, “to make their interests our own.”

Believing, as I most firmly do, that the present expedition

should not have been necessary, and that, had we looked at the problem from the tribal point of view and continued to carry out the policy of gradual Sandemanization, instead of reverting to a fatal compromise, it would never have occurred, it is perhaps not to be wondered at that I am filled with sorrow to see what Sandeman believed in and what my father and I strove for—the friendship of the tribes—turned once again into bitterness and hatred, or that I ask myself “Was this really necessary?”

Why also is it that we will not understand that, when we are not carrying out the very essence of a policy, as well as many of its most fundamental principles, we are certainly not in a position to say that that policy has failed?

Yet this is, by no means, the first time in our history, nor probably will it be the last—when, faced with our own shortcomings, we have proceeded to accuse a system, instead of accusing those who, while giving lip-service to it, have failed entirely to carry it out.

For example, the whole essence of Lord Curzon’s Frontier policy was that the Frontier Militias were to be supported, in case of trouble. When, therefore, we withdrew the Militias and refused to support them, was it just to say that his policy had failed? Yet that is what we did.

In like manner, the very essence of Sandeman’s policy was the welfare of the tribes. “What are my views,” he once said, “but merely those which every Christian man or woman should feel towards his less fortunate neighbours?” When, therefore, we allow the end and object of his policy to take a very secondary place, we cannot in justice say that the policy has failed.

Perhaps the answer to the question why we will not see what really seems so apparent may be given in Lyautey’s words: “The whole problem lies in the fact that our military and civilian authorities can only conceive this intervention in the form of an ‘expedition’ and that is rightly regarded as alarming. Yet what makes me furiously angry; what makes my blood boil is the realization that, after these four years, after all I have written and done elsewhere and here, no one understands anything of my methods.”

Sandeman is dead these fifty years. Lyautey is also dead. Yet can we say that we understand their methods? We still harp on their impossibility, although they have always succeeded wherever they have been tried, whenever they have been fully carried out.

We still put forward the excuse of expense. Yet, was Sandeman’s policy expensive in the long run? What did it save us during the various Afghan Wars? Has it not stood the test of time? Was Lyautey’s expensive? What did it save

France during the Great War? The value of his achievement during that time cannot be computed. Was Lyautey, then, right in saying "I would answer with my eyes shut and with all my conscience for the result and *the economy*." Am I too bold in saying that it did prove itself and was proving itself in Waziristan between 1923 and 1928, and for some years afterwards?

Why, then, will we not understand? Is it not that, "alarmed" by the possibility that such a policy of "intervention" might lead to an "expedition," we adopted a half-hearted policy of "compromise" which, as is so often the case, inevitably led us into the very thing we were trying so desperately hard to avoid—an "expedition" with all its attendant losses in lives and money?

"It is something," Lyautey went on to say, "to be still carrying somewhere a respect for our name amongst these fine warrior races; they are amazed by our justice and moderation; our abstention from all violence, no less than the turn-out of our troops; and, faced by the warlike instrument of which we need only press the trigger, they hasten to us to settle old disputes, according to our wishes. I have thus completely wound up my years' accounts without a single rifle shot, though I was ready to fire, as they well knew."

Surely the lesson is, again, a very simple one. It is the lesson of the Frontier and of dealings with all such warrior races that "he who is ready to draw the sword is the man who is least likely to have to do so." Both Lyautey and Sandeman succeeded because they did not shirk their responsibilities. They did not allow "I dare not" wait upon "I will." They worked for the benefit of the people committed to their charge, encouraged them to bring their disputes to be settled, and gave them justice—justice to which they had been strangers. In short, theirs was a policy which combined strength with beneficence. You cannot rule a Pathan by fear only. But neither can you rule him unless he respects you, and he will not respect you unless he also fears you.

Yet still we refuse to face the real issue. And what is the alternative—to return to the old "Close Border" system of "non-intervention tempered by expeditions" until we wake up some day to find all the tribes against us—at a possibly far more critical time than at present?

I cannot, I think, do better than conclude by repeating my father's remedy and his warning:

"There is only one true remedy and that is to do away with all feeble makeshifts, such as 'Protected Areas' and by the exercise of a just and civilizing control secure safety of life and property and the development of the country and its

resources. Thus only can we hope to secure the respect of the tribes on both sides of the border and bring them in definitely on our side, a source of strength instead of an ever-present danger."

Surely with so great an object and so great an end in view we shall succeed eventually in making these men our friends. It is at any rate worth trying.

"An army is conquered by the sword, the people by justice," is a wise saying. We may have conquered the tribal armies of Waziristan, but the far more difficult conquest still lies before us—to conquer its people.

